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ABSTRACT 
This Master's Research Project examines the manner in 
which the City of Providence reviewed a development strategy 
prepared by consultants for its downtown, and attempted to 
generate proposals for a fresh approach to central city 
planning and management. A profile of the existing political 
milieu and economic environment are furnished as a context 
for critiquing the consultants' report and the City's 
response to their findings. Case studies of alternative 
methods for promoting public-private partnerships in central 
cities are then analyzed as a basis for the development of a 
prototypical planning and management entity tailored to the 
needs of downtown Providence, Rhode Island. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
1 
"One of the great causes of problems is solutions." 
Eric Severeid, 1976 
"For every complex and difficult problem there is 
one clear and simple solution - and it's wrong." 
H.L. Mencken (Attrib.) 
2 
1.1 The research issue and objectives 
With the submission of the Do~E!2~E Q~y~12E~~E! ~!E~!~BY 
by consultants Carr. Lynch Associates and Melvin Levine and 
Associates in March. 1986. the City of Providence Department 
of Planning and Development is faced with a complicated set 
of choices for promoting stability and growth in the city 
core. The central question of this Master's Research Project 
will be to identify the most beneficial policy options for 
the creation of a lasting public-private sector pact. geared 
to stimulating downtown growth. 
The analysis will deal first with substantive issues. 
including: a synopsis of Carr. Lynch's and Levine's work; a 
review and critique of the Strategy on its face; and an 
analysis of how downtown Providence is managed currently. 
The second section will address policy and process issues. 
including: the City's response to the Strategy upon its 
reception; input mechanisms aimed at the downtown community 
in formulating the Strategy (the establishment of a Downtown 
Strategy Task Force. consisting of professionals and local 
experts); feedback mechanisms for assessing community 
response to the Strategy (a survey instrument aimed at 
downtown interest groups); the generation of planning 
alternatives; and recommendations for policy adoption and 
implementation. 
1.2 Significance of the problem 
The City of Providence is faced with analyzing the 
3 
efficacy of a thorough reworking of its downtown plans by 
independent consultants. The significance of such an 
opportunity to the present-day planning student is that 
Providence's downtown is a microcosm of the impacts of 
current municipal fiscal trends and of the potential for 
an integrated. institutionalized response to patterns of 
urban decline. 
With the curtailment of federal funding programs. which 
for many years were a mainstay of local community budgets. 
city governments have been forced to look to their own more 
limited resources in the preservation of positive planning 
practices. Innovation has been spawned primarily by an 
awareness of the need to stabilize tax bases in a highly 
competitive economic environment. an environment in which 
current industrial and commercial location decisions may 
dictate the health of a city in future decades. The compound 
effects of failing to promote a community's assets or 
addressing its problems might prove to be devastating to the 
economic and social health of an urban area. with 
implications far beyond the limited boundaries of the CBD. 
Urban areas have chosen to ameliorate the impacts of 
dwindling funding sources in a number of ways. Developing 
public-private partnerships in downtown revitalization serves 
both public and private interests by ensuring the more 
efficient expenditure of capital. Keeping existing uses in 
the central city. as well as attracting new uses to the core. 
demands of urban planners skills not previously associated 
4 
with municipal government staff. New management techniques 
which bow to the requisites of private capital (leveraging 
that capital to behave in a manner which is conducive to the 
public interest), while preserving a strong awareness of 
wider community needs, are paramount. One outcome of this 
new awareness is the concept of quasi-autonomous, quasi-
public downtown management entities or 'Downtown Management 
Corporations'. as they have become known. 
City legislatures are understanding the need to cede 
some of their traditional public powers to newly designated 
agencies with more specific roles and jurisdictions. 
Clearly, the problems faced by neighborhoods are not 
replicated in the urban core. Central city planning is 
geared to furnishing both physical and policy infrastructures 
designed to foster strong economic development: ensuring the 
construction and maintenance of an integrated physical 
infrastructure; providing free-flowing circulation and 
adequate parking facilities; offering loans at rates well 
below market prime to supplement venture capital and to 
improve space absorption levels; providing strategic grant 
injections into small scale projects which would not 
otherwise be initiated; coordinating the efforts of existing 
public and private non-prof it agencies geared to servicing 
downtown uses; and actively marketing the downtown district, 
the inventory of available space, and the availability of 
public monies and planning support. 
5 
1.3 The conceptual framework 
While the goal of this study is to make purposeful 
recommendations for planning in downtown Providence at the 
'metapolicy' level (that is. the strategic rather than the 
tactical scale). the approach is far from comprehensive. The 
limited fiscal resources of the municipality. as well as the 
major emphasis of the City Department of Planning and 
Development on economic development issues. dictate a 
political milieu in which public-private partnership and a 
project-by-project funding approach are mandated. The 
constraint of prevailing planning practice limits the choices 
in theoretical alternatives for final recommendations in this 
study. An implicit objective of this thesis is to propose 
realistic goals for implementation of a Downtown Development 
Strategy. the study for which has already been conducted by 
carefully briefed consultants. A personal. academic 
preference for freedom in venturing radical alternatives for 
central city planning is therefore tempered by pre-existing 
political and planning environments which. at least in 
Providence. amount to one and the same entity. 
For the most part. then. theoretical considerations will 
not step outside the contextual framework set by the City of 
Providence. (As shall be demonstrated. this has given rise 
to enough internal conflict in and of itself.) Rather. a 
less rationalized approach to the Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy 
and its implications for the city is reserved in reviewing 
and critiquing (a) the recommendations prescribed by the 
6 
Strategy (Chapter 5) and (b) alternatives for establishing a 
new management agency specifically for the downtown area 
(Chapters 9 and 10). 
The aim of the thesis is to go beyond mere cataloging of 
one task of the Providence Department of Planning and 
Development; by analyzing the process of establishing an 
experimental approach to downtown planning, it is hoped that 
considerable insight into the development of a fresh planning 
paradigm will be achieved. 
1.4 Procedures and methods of analysis 
Because of the nature of the research, the approach to 
this study is qualitative rather than quantitative. 
Methodologies include: an extensive survey of the 
literature; telephone and face-to-face interviews with 
downtown representatives from both public and private 
sectors; comparative analyses of the benefits of theoretical 
models of downtown management; commentary and criticism of 
past and current practices of downtown management. 
The use of grid matrices for the comparison of existing 
downtown management functions, by agency type and for the 
assessment of functions and jurisdictions of experimental 
management entities elsewhere in the U.S.A. is applied in 
Chapters 6 and 9. Quantitative measures of social, fiscal 
and economic trends are limited to Chapter 2. A limited 
statistical analysis of the responses to a survey instrument, 
designed to tap the mood of those most directly affected by 
7 
planned change in downtown. was conducted for the purposes of 
Chapter 8. 
1.5 Organization of the study 
The principal recommendation of the Downtown Development 
Strategy submitted to the City of Providence by Carr. Lynch 
Associates and Melvin Levine and Associates is to establish 
an implementation and management entity to oversee downtown 
development. This Master's Research Project will examine in 
detail alternative theories for addressing short-term urban 
decline and. in particular. the public and quasi-public 
agencies selected by diverse American cities in attempting to 
promote and manage growth. The final chapter of the thesis 
will attempt to set down concrete policy proposals for the 
City of Providence as its agencies begin the complex task of 
reviewing and adopting a new downtown plan. 
The structure of this thesis is organized in two 
sections: 
I• The Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy: Substantive Issues -
This section describes and analyses the work of the 
consultants. observing their report. first as a self-
contained document apart from the milieu of downtown 
Providence (as an objective piece of research) and. second. 
to provide a bridge to Section II. the Strategy is critiqued 
as a prescription for change within the milieu of the city. 
II. Policy and Process Issues: Developing Planning and 
Management for Downtown Providence. Rhode Island -
8 
The reception of the plan and the search for alternative 
policies for its implementation are approached from two 
standpoints. First, from the vantage point of the policy 
makers as they grapple with the actuality of adopting a fresh 
approach to downtown and, second, from a personal 
interpretation of the experiences of other American cities 
and the development of a hypothetical structure for planning 
in Providence's core. 
*** 
9 
SECTION I 
THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY: 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 
10 
CHAPTER 2 
THE ECONOMY OF DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE: 
THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING. EXISTING CONDITIONS 
AND THE NEED FOR INTERVENTION 
11 
"Downtown Providence today appears to be in a 
state of suspended animation. just between 
decline and renewal." 
Carr. Lynch Associates. 1986 
"Some think I'm too optimistic. but I believe 
growth in Boston can't help but soon spill over 
into Providence. I'm betting on a symbiotic 
relationship between the two cities. and I'm not 
the only one." 
John Ryan. Providence realtor. 1986 
"We're on a roll. and this is only the beginning." 
Kenneth Orenstein. Executive Director. 
Providence Foundation. 1986 
12 
2.1 Times have changed 
In a recent article in ~~~!~E ~~~iE~~2 ~~z~~iE~· the 
author of an article on Rhode Island's capital city 
substituted the names of Providence's first families for 
those of the Massachusetts Brahmin. thus: 
"Here's to dear old Providence. 
Home of johnny cakes and scrod. 
Where Metcalfs speak only to Browns 
And Browns speak only to God." 
It is true that Providence's great philanthropists. 
cultural figures and educators have commanded greater 
national attention in recent decades than has its 
contribution to the regional economy of New England. Indeed. 
as Caroline Knapp and Peter Kadzis (1986) have noted. "By the 
late 1950s Providence, like many northeastern cities. had 
fallen from industrial grace and succumbed to urban grit". 
A sustained period of virtually uninterrupted economic 
growth from 1850 to the immediate post-war years gave way to 
a seemingly unstoppable period of economic decline. Only in 
the mid-1980s have politicians found the resolve to tackle 
Providence's problems head on. In a July. 1983 issue of the 
Wall ~.!.!~~! ~~~EE~l a front page story denounced Rhode Island 
as "the region's dowdy neighbor. clinging to old gritty 
industries and grappling with big economic problems". 
Nowhere was the impact of this negative image - read about 
nationally by the nation's most influential investors - felt 
more strongly than in the city of Providence. Despite the 
13 
overwhelming defeat of the QE~~~EEE2~ fE~E~£! (perhaps the 
only attempt at regional economic planning ever seen in Rhode 
Island), the stage was set for indignant politicians to sit 
down together. to bury the disruptive nature of partisan 
Rhode Island politics, and to contrive to overcome the 
entrenched pattern of decline in the state's capital city. 
2.2 The regional context 
In the Proyi~~~£~ §E~~~Z ~EEE~~l (October 5, 1986). 
Froma Joselow described New England as the new "Star of the 
American economy". To understand the contextual setting for 
economic circumstances in Providence, recent regional events 
are key. An interim report by the Department of Commerce 
reported by the Ocean State Business Development Authority in 
its first ~E!~Elz ~~EEE!• 1986, states that New England has 
the nation's lowest unemployment rate (4.1 percent, compared 
to the national average of 6.7 percent). The average New 
England worker has a personal income - income from all 
sources before taxes - of $15,387, higher than any of the 
other eight regions. The U.S. average is $13,451. It 
appears that the words of John Naissbitt in his much-vaunted 
work, Me~~!E~~~~· were far from prophetic: "The North-South 
shift is irreversible in our lifetime ••• For economic growth 
give me Texas, California and Florida, and you can have the 
other forty-seven". With regard to the shift of population 
southwards to the Sunbelt, Joselow (1986) notes, "Most of us 
simply did not go". 
14 
New England survived the curse of the negative 
prophesies, to the surprise of many New Englanders 
themselves, perhaps because of two essential economic 
ingredients which were added in 1980. National policies 
under Ronald Reagan began once more to favor defense oriented 
industries and the emerging high technology fields. New 
England. particularly eastern Massachusetts was strong in 
both. Second, the price of oil ceased to increase and, 
indeed, began to fall. This stabilized costs for ailing New 
England industries, while rendering the Sunbelt far less 
attractive to potential migrants. 
But within this rosy regional picture lie pockets of 
decay which have not benefitted from the positive changes 
experienced elsewhere. As Jeff Taylor, Director of Community 
Development in Berlin, New Hampshire recently stated in the 
Bo~!~~ Q1~£~ (September 8, 1986), "When you lose a job in 
northern New England, the bus station is a better bet than 
the local employment office". And within the flourishing 
economy of southern New England, sandwiched between the 
success stories of Connecticut and Massachusetts, Rhode 
Island seems very much the poor relative. 
Within southeastern New England, Rhode Island and, in 
particular, Providence face competition from a number of 
highly successful regional service centers. Map 2.1 shows 
the location of the state capital in relation to Boston, 
Nashua, Springfield, New Haven and New York. All of these 
cities have shown marked economic recoveries in the first 
15 
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half of this decade. The Bank of Boston's~~ ~E~l~EE 
EcOE£~Y (1980-1986) chronicles a widening gap between Rhode 
Island and the rest of New England. The state's hourly 
manufacturing wage of $7.91 is the lowest in the region and 
the fifth lowest in the nation. The national average is 
$9.70 per hour. The difference between Rhode Island and New 
England manufacturing wages has widened. from 81 cents in 
1982 to $1.02 in the first quarter of 1986. In terms of 
disposable income - net income after taxes - Rhode Islanders 
average $13,620 compared with $15,200 for the region. This 
gap has also widened, from $1,440 in 1984 to $1,580 in the 
first quarter of 1986. 
Robert Magaziner, one of the pioneering researchers 
involved in the Q~EE£~~~ ££~£~£!• noted in an interview 
with the Pr£yi~~E£~ ~£~EE~! (October 5, 1986) that in 1984 
the number of jobs available in Rhode Island increased only 4 
percent, a figure somewhat less than the region's mean figure 
of 5.6 percent and even the nation's mean of 4.7 percent. 
For 1985, Magaziner cites Rhode Island Department of Economic 
Development figures which indicate a worsening situation: 
employment grew only 1.3 percent against New England's 3.7 
percent and the nation's 3.3 percent. 
Clearly, a few key employers are sustaining the state's 
economy. Electric Boat (a subsidiary of General Electric) 
and Raytheon Corporation together provide some 8,500 jobs, 
most of which are entirely dependent upon federal defense 
contracts. Magaziner estimates that should these contracts 
17 
not be renewed at current expenditure levels. the state would 
rapidly see an increase of one to 1.5 percentage points in 
its unemployment rate. 
To the extent that Rhode Island is holding its own 
against an entrenched pattern of manufacturing decline. 
a recent paper by William Jackson (1985) of the Brown 
University Research Foundation. cited by Knapp and Kadzis 
(1986). suggests that "Rhode Island is not doing well because 
of Rhode Island. but because of the run-off from Boston". 
Steady jobs are increasingly found in the lower paid service 
sector and are more dependent than ever on the commercial 
success of corporations headquartered outside the state. 
In the editorial section of the latest New ~QZ1~Q~ 
EC£Q£~X (1986). James Howell of the Bank of Boston notes. 
"The New England economy is like a West Texas rattlesnake. 
To survive it has to shed its skin." Nowhere is his warning 
more applicable than in Providence. Rhode Island. 
2.3 A portrait of Providence 
At the economic. political and cultural hub of Rhode 
Island is its capital city. Providence. This urban center of 
some 156.804 individuals (U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1980) is 
located at the head of Narragansett Bay on the Providence 
River. 43 miles south of Boston and 175 miles northeast of 
New York. On its borders are the cities of Pawtucket. 
Cranston and East Providence. and the towns of Johnston and 
North Providence. 
18 
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THE PROVIDENCE-WARWICK-PAWTUCKET S.M.S.A. 
At the heart of the Providence-Warwick-Pawtucket 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (Map 2.2). Providence 
is theoretically more accessible to Rhode Island residents 
than at any previous time (Map 2.3). Travel times from 
peripheral areas to the city have been reduced by up to half 
an hour (State Department of Transportation figures). 
However. the upgraded road network has proved to be a double-
edged sword; no longer is it necessary to go to Providence. 
The north-south corridor which incorporates Routes I-295. I-
95. 1. 2 and 4 have permitted otner metropolitan and suburban 
communities to grow at unprecedented rates since the mid-
1970s. Freed from the legacy of obsolete infrastructures. 
perceived congestion and abandoned industrial buildings - all 
of which predominate in Providence's core areas - communities 
with room to grow have deposed the capital city's role as a 
regional service center. Warwick. Cranston. Pawtucket and. 
more recently. East Greenwich and North Kingstown have become 
major suppliers of goods and services. 
- A pattern of residential relocation 
Concomitantly. a southwards population shift has 
occurred. As migrants have decanted from the state's core 
region. they have settled in urban and suburban communities 
along major state and interstate routes (Marcia Marker Feld 
et al. 1985). Table 2.1 shows selected social/demographic 
indicators demonstrating the effects of out-migration on the 
city. Total population fell by 12.5 percent from 179.213 in 
1970 to 156.804 in 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1970. 
20 
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TABLE 2. 1 
SOCIAL AND DE"06RAPHIC INDICATOkS 
CITY OF PROVIDENCE 
1970. 1980 
l CHANGE 
1970 1980 1970-80 
rota I Population 179213 1511804 -12.5 
Hed1an Aoe 32.1 29.9 -b.9 
I o5 vears + 26300 24057 -8.5 
I < 18 vears 48745 36419 -25.3 
I Households 62984 1>0157 -4.5 
I Black Households 3587 4200 17.1 
I HousinQ Units b8133 b7535 -1), 9 
Persons /~ousehold 2.69 2.44 -9.3 
I Professionals 10677 8707 -18.5 
I Clerical 13976 11316 -19.0 
I Crafts1en 8908 7834 -12.1 
I Operatives 15990 10851 -32.1 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1970, 1980 
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1980). Corresponding declines were witnessed in figures for 
the total number of households (62,984 to 60,157 in the same 
period) and the number of both young and elderly citizens 
(26,300 to 24,057 in the over 65 year cohort, and 48,745 to 
36,419 in the under 18 year cohort). The statewide figures 
for this cohort show an increase in population, from 317,728 
in 1970 to 372,672 in 1980, constituting a 17.3 percent 
increase. 
When compared to the picture of residential growth in 
the surrounding communities of Warwick and Cranston, 
Providence appears to be losing more ground in the period 
since the last census was taken. Figures for residential 
building permits granted in the period 1980 to 1984 
demonstrate the continuing decline in neighborhood 
development in the state capital, with significant growth 
concentrated in Warwick and Cranston (Figure 2.1). When 
Providence's residential growth is viewed cumulatively as a 
share of development in the three communities, it takes only 
18 percent of the total (Figure 2.2). Both Warwick and 
Cranston have grown more impressively, 40 percent and 42 
percent. respectively (State Department of Economic 
Development. 1986). Table 2.2 c~nfirms significant growth in 
the periphery of the metropolitan region and only marginal 
growth in the core, while Table 2.3 indicates a net negative 
impact on the value of property in the capital (median 
property value of $38,000) when compared to values in Warwick 
and Cranston with median values of $40.700 and $45,500, 
23 
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TABLE 2. 2 
. . 
RESIDENTIAL BUILDl~6 PERllITS, 1980 - 1984 
INCREASE TOT~L EHSTIN6 I INCREASE 
CITY 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 srncE t 980 UNITS 1980 SIHCE 1980 
Providenci! 193 m bb 197 lb SSS b7535 0.9I 
Cr ans ton 151 ~j3 11 ~,, "~- 423 1340 27280 S.OI 
~ari4ick 19b 311 !Ob 45b 203 1272 32450 4.0I 
Source: Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 1985 
TABLE 2.3 
GENERAL HOUSING INDICATORS, 1980 
City 1 Renter I 011ner lledian lledian 
Occupied Occupied Rent Value 
Providence 63.1 36.9 U39 $38000 
Cranston 32.3 67.7 $186 $45500 
Marwick 25.0 75.0 $228 $40700 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 
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respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980). 
The industrial and commercial experiences 
Figure 2.3 indicates that, while Providence is once more 
managing to recapture a sizeable share of regional 
manufacturing opportunity, its performance since 1980 has 
been far from outstanding. Table 2.4 indicates that the city 
has experienced only approximately one half of the growth in 
manufacturing space witnessed by Cranston (211,000 square 
feet of new space in Providence versus 419,000 square feet in 
Cranston). If these figures are set in the context of total 
statewide manufacturing construction, Providence has captured 
only 6.07 percent of all new space, while Cranston has 
attracted 12.05 percent and Warwick 10.09 percent. The 
summary table of social/demographic indicators (Table 2.1) is 
further evidence of the city's inability to foster industrial 
growth. The labor market for Providence residents no longer 
supports a strong blue collar manufacturing workforce: the 
number of employees who found jobs in the Machine Operators 
and Assemblers census category fell from 15,990 in 1970 to 
10,851 in 1980, while in the Precision Production and Crafts 
census category jobs declined from 8,908 to 7,834 in the same 
period (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980). 
The development of new commercial space within the 
SMSA indicates that Providence is attracting retail 
development at a rate which might be expected of a state 
capital (Table 2.5). Its 21.16 percent share of new 
commercial development statewide since 1980 would suggest a 
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TABLE 2.4 
NEM "ANUFACTURING CONSTRUCTION, 1980-1983 
1980 1981 
21 4b 
184 104 
110 Sb 
Source: 
lOOO 's of Square Feet of Floor Space by Year 
INCREASE I OF STATE INCREASE 
1902 1183 1930-1983 1980-1983 (347S) 
35 109 211 b.07 
bl 70 419 12.05 
bl as 351 [I). 09 
Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 
19 85 
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TABLE 2. 5 
NEW CQMMERCIAL CONSTRUCTION, 1990-1984 
Square Feet by Year 
. INCREASE % OF STATE INCREASE CITY 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1980-1984 1980-1984 (71169421 
Providence 59446 165165 681526 350000 250000 1506137 21.16 Cranston 53699 185525 70725 137899 104134 551982 7.76 
~arwick 182852 124890 101163 354858 378631 142394 16.05 
Source: Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 
1985 
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sustained, healthy retail sector. But this is not the case. 
Table 2.6 clearly demonstrates that Warwick. with 15.9 
percent of total state retail sales has surpassed Providence. 
with 14.4 percent. Indeed, a recent market analysis of 
Providence's commercial core found that supermarkets and 
department stores have been supplanted by low order 
convenience shops and fancy goods establishments. Further, 
the majority of retail trade is conducted between the hours 
of noon and 2:00 PM by downtown office workers (Carr, Lynch 
and Levine, 1986). So where has the real growth in the 
commercial sector. indicated by the figures in Table 2.5. 
taken place? 
Perhaps the only sector of the citywide economy which 
has experienced significant growth in recent years (and, 
incidentally, served to hold up the local economy) is the 
service sector (Smolski. 1986). Table 2.7 shows the 
proportion of statewide service industry receipts taken by 
Rhode Island's three largest cities. Clearly, Providence. 
with 35.2 percent of the state total and $466,170,000 in 
receipts (Rhode Island Department of Economic Development~ 
1986), has captured the largest share of the service. 
information. technological, banking, finance, insurance, 
and consulting industries within the state. The headquarters 
of state government. state agencies. regional banks and 
industries choose Providence because of its central location. 
its provision of communications technology. its 
infrastructure and the presence of complementary service 
29 
TABLE 2.6 
RANK BY VOLUME OF RETAIL SALES, 1982 
City State Rank Saies ($1000) I of Total State 
Sales 
Pro'l i d~nce 2 S599787 14. ~ 
Cr ans ton .) S29'1146 7 .1'1 
~arw i ck S66296 4 15. 't 
Source: Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 
1985 
TABLE 2. 7 
RANK BY VOLUME OF SERVICE INDUSTRY RECEIPTS, 1982 
City State Rank Receipt lSI OOOl % of State 
Receipts 
Providence I $466170 35.2 
Cranston 4 SB7034 6.44 
WarMick 2 $149061 11.03 
Source: Rhode Island Basic Economic Statistics, 
1985 
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uses. In this sense. Providence is truly a state capital and 
regional service center. But its overdependence on one 
industrial sector and its perceived low desirability as a 
residential location and as an environment for sound client-
oriented. face-to-face trade have been barriers to balanced 
economic development (Arthur Markos. interview. August. 
1986). 
- An unpredictable fiscal future 
Table 2.8 summarizes the fiscal experience of the City 
of Providence during the period 1980 to 1985. In a recent 
seminar given as part of The University of Rhode Island's 
'Professional Guest Lecturer Series' in the graduate planning 
program (October 8. 1986). Mr. Arthur Markos. Planning 
Director of the City of Providence. noted some drastic trends 
in the budget planning of the municipality. In the fiscal 
years 1980 to 1987. the nationwide federal cuts in urban 
revenue sharing programs amount to a decline of 71 percent. 
Of slated social spending cuts in the federal budget for this 
period. which amount to some $10.000.000.000. urban programs 
will account for some $7.soo.ooo.ooo. Proposed for either 
elimination or phased reduction are Urban Development Action 
Grants. Small Business Administration loans. housing 
r e habilitation programs. economic development schemes. and. 
most significantly for Providence. Community Development 
Block Grants. 
Substantial increases in UDAG and CDBG monies made 
available through programs established in the mid- and late-
31 
TABLE 2. 8 
FISCAL TRENDS! CITY OF PROVIDENCE. 1980-198~ 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
Total Revenues 115,680,751 117,545,120 140, 051. 906 152.508,215 153,726,454 160,482,075 
Propertv Tax 12; 40L 530 12;326,656 e1;514;e96 90,303;204 92. 794; 781 96;489;782 
i: Residential 42.3 42.0 41.4 40.0 39.6 38.8 
t Co11ercial 29.3 30.1 31.1 31.2 32.5 32.6 
% lndustri al 9.8 9.1 8.3 7.7 7.5 8.6 
% Other 18.6 18.8 19.2 21.1 20.4 20.0 
State Aid 22,987,193 24,196,290 30,804,180 35,781,729 44,875,327 47,769,449 
State School Aid 795;000 · 947;000 1;012;000 1;235,000 L525;ooo 1,675,000 
Federal Aid 440,991 113,077 148,870 5;115,106 5;23o;n2 5,269,753 
Fed. School Aid 68,000 47;000 61 ;000 · 65;ooo 36,000 . 32;000 
Source: Rhode Island Department of Community Affairs, 
1980-1985 
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1970s began to decline from a high point of federal revenue 
sharing in 1983. when Providence received $5.715.106 in 
direct federal aid (Table 2.8). The City Administration 
anticipates gradual decreases in federal monies for the 
immediate future. Revaluation of properties for the purpose 
of the property tax levy is currently in the research phase. 
but neither this nor incremental increases in state aid will 
buffer the anticipated loss in federal cuts (Arthur Markos. 
guest lecturer. The University of Rhode Island. 1986). 
Mayors have been consistently reluctant to increase local 
taxes; local terms of office are for four years and such 
increases would not be 'psychologically' absorbed by the 
electorate before the next elections. 
The single largest subsidy preferred by the City is in 
the area of public education. Table 2.8 clearly demonstrates 
the shift in external assistance. As federal aid has 
contracted in this decade. so the state has been forced to 
intervene with significant annual increases in fiscal 
support. from $785.000 in 1980 to $1.675.000 in 1985. 
Indeed. it was limited fiscal resources - in the face of 
self-perpetuating urban problems - that brought back into 
the spotlight the pressing issues associated with downtown 
Providence. 
2.4 The ripeness of a specifically 'downtown' plan 
It was doubts about the availability of funds for 
innovative future planning. not only in education but across 
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the broad spectrum of public sector policy making. that 
brought the focus of Mayor Joseph R. Paolino. Jr. and the 
senior staff at the Department of Planning and Development to 
bear upon the issue of breathing new life into downtown 
Providence. Acutely aware of the social. economic and fiscal 
trends outlined in this chapter. the Administration realized 
that the city core was not recovering from years of decline 
and recession in the manner of Cranston. Warwick and other 
Rhode Island central places. Fears about the implications of 
continuing decline. coupled with an awareness of the 
potential benefits to be derived from tapping the positive 
residual effects of the booming Boston regional economy. led 
to a fresh perspective on the value of downtown as a catalyst 
for change. Already. by 1985. there were plans for the 
Capital Center Project. a public-private partnership of 
unprecedented scale geared toward revitalizing 60 acres in 
the State Capitol Building area of downtown. Likewise. the 
Plan for the Providence Waterfront was in the early stages of 
implementation. based upon the designs of William Warner. the 
consulting architect. But what of the old downtown. the 
historic core. the financial and retail district? Prevailing 
conditions both in terms of the physical fabric and the 
delicate economic position demanded closer attention. 
As the consultants who were selected to conduct the 
study for downtown were quick to point out. missing the boat 
this time might destroy the chances of recovery forever. 
Chester Smolski. Director of Urban Studies at Rhode Island 
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College wrote in a recent article (1986), of the time being 
"right" for a fresh approach to downtown planning. Paolino 
himself caught the tide of renewed optimism for the center of 
the city when he delivered his Second Annual State of the 
City Address (January, 1986): "There is a new and exciting 
feeling when you mention Providence. It is a feeling that 
comes from the changes we have made and from experiencing the 
sheer beauty and magnificence of a city coming back to life." 
Later in his speech, a note of realism and caution set 
in: "Still, there is much work to be done before our downtown 
truly becomes a centerpiece for the neighborhoods •.. " Here, 
then, is the context for a fresh analysis of the plight of 
downtown Providence. Paolino, ever careful not to 
overemphasize the central city for fear of offending the 
neighborhoods (in which the voters dwell), but all the while 
conscious of his vested realty interests in the urban core 
(the Paolino family owns and manages substantial commercial 
holdings in the historic core district), acknowledged that 
public policy would once more dwell seriously on downtown: "A 
comprehensive downtown strategy will be completed this year. 
I am asking the Director of Planning and Development to make 
recommendations based on that strategy and report them to me 
by . " spring ••• 
As things transpired, however, the planning and policy 
environment changedi the re-emphasis of downtown in city 
planning was to be held back until after the elections. 
Influential members of the Greater Providence Chamber of 
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Commerce advised Paolino privately not to push the plan too 
hard before the November. 1986 elections. But in the interim 
period. May through October. an orchestrated campaign of 
further research and analysis. public consultation. policy 
generation and strategy modification was conducted. Under 
the aegis of Department Director. Arthur Markos. a team of 
city staffers and downtown professionals from both public and 
private sectors began to hammer out the form and substance of 
future planning - its substance. funding and management -
in downtown Providence. 
2.5 A portrait of downtown 
An assessment of the picture of Providence's core which 
presents itself to the planner in 1986. shows elements both 
positive and negative. Visually. downtown is a microcosm of 
the intensive and diverse land uses of the archetypal 
American central city. During the daytime. corporate bankers 
rub shoulders with high school gangs. At night. a 
cosmopolitan. but low profile. mix of theater goers and chic 
restaurant patrons stroll nonchalantly past a more visible 
hotchpotch of homosexual bar cliques. shabby street folk. 
drug addicts and drunks. On one side of Dorrance Street. in 
a clearly delineated zone stretching to the river. are the 
skyscrapers in which the Fleet National and Rhode Island 
Hospital Trust banks are located. On the other. encqmpassing 
the blocks up to Empire Street. are shabby stores. 
underutilized office buildings. bars. tabacconists and dingy 
36 
drug stores. Depending on the extent of his idealism. a 
planner's dream - or his nightmare. And adding grist to his 
mill or sense of purpose. is the knowledge that things were 
not always this way. and need not pe so today. Armed with 
their batch of descriptive statistics could not the city 
planners find an appropriate strategy for change? Clearly. 
the Mayor and his planning director thought that they could. 
For the moment. though. the descriptive statistics. 
- The changing profile of downtown residents 
Table 2.9 presents a summary of demographic and 
employment indicators for census tract 08. Downtown 
Providence (U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1970. 1980). The 
areal delineation of downtown. for the purposes of this 
analysis. corresponds to census tract 08 as defined by 
Map 2.4. 
While the total population of Providence has declined 
over the past decade. downtown has experienced a 32 percent 
increase from 1.560 individuals in 1970 to 2.045 in 1980. 
Concomitantly. a 38 percent increase in the number of housing 
units was witnessed in the same period (from 885 to 1.223). 
as was an increase in dwelling density which rose from 2.86 
units per acre in 1970 to 3.96 units per acre in 1980. Much 
of this increase is attributable to two large scale tower 
block developments aimed at the elderly. The pre-existing 
housing stock is occupied by a broad cross-section of 
Providence citizens. but a notable change in the demographic 
composition h as occurred since 1970. The number of 
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TABLE 2.9 
SOCJHL HNO OEHOGRMPHIC INDICATORS 
DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE 
1970, 1980 
t CHHN6E 
1970 1980 1970-80 
fatal Population lSoO 2045 32.0 
Population/Acre 5.05 b.b2 31. l 
I Housinq Uni ts 885 1223 38.2 
t Uni ts iAcre 2.86 3.96 38.5 
t White Households 1449 1803 24.4 
t Black Households 84 162 92. 9 
t Hale !Harried! 265 201 -24.2 
I Hale !Sinolel 332 471 41. 9 
t Fe1ale !Harried) 236 187 -20.8 
I Feaale !Sinolel 231 481 108.2 
I in HiQh School 8 5 -37.5 
t Lived in Sate 
House for 5 vrs 506 746 47.4 
% Hale Une1ploved 1. 5 8 433.3 
I Fe1. Une1ploved 2.6 9.3 257.7 
t Professionals 113 198 75.2 
I in Hanufacturing 130 134 3.1 
I in F. I.R.E. 30 148 393.3 
I Fa1ilies 
< Pov er tv Leve 1 12.S 2.8 -77.6 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1970, 1980 
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MAP 2.4 
PROVIDENCE, CENSUS TRACTS 
' \.---- ) ___ ] 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970, 1980 
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professional job-holders increased by 98 percent. 1970 to 
1980. The number of manufacturing employees increased by 
only 3.1 percent. Those employed in the Finance. Insurance 
and Real Estate census category increased by 393 pe r cent 
(Table 2.9). 
Clearly. there has been a shift toward those individuals 
employed in the burg eo ning downtown service industries and. 
conversely. an expected decline in those inner city residents 
who once found work in the city's manufacturing sector. This 
hypothesis is reinforced by Melvin Levine's market analysis 
for upmarket residential dwellings conducted in the Downtown 
Development Strategy (discussed in Chapter 4). Young 
professional singles and couples. the 'Yuppies'. are 
appearing on the downtown scene. taking apartments on the 
lower East Side and attics in the historic core. 
The local economy and the pattern of land use 
Steve Carr. one of the consultants who presented the 
Downtown Strategy before a public forum at City Hall in July. 
1986. opened his talk with the words. "Downtown Providence 
today appears to be in a state of suspended animation. just 
between decline and renewal ••• " His words aptly summarize 
the state of flux evidenced by the downtown economy. The 
existing office. retail and housing sectors are all lagging 
behind their full potential. But. while Corliss Landing and 
South Main Street (encompassed by the Waterfront District 
Plan) and the area between the old railroad tracks and the 
State Capitol Building (overseen by the Capital Center 
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Commission) already have detailed plans for revitalization 
and economic development, the historic core - where the bulk 
of existing downtown offices and shops are located - has 
received little attention. Within a clearly defined study 
area (Map 2.5), agreed upon by the City and its special 
consultants, these negative economic trends appear to be most 
acute and demanding of unique policy solutions. 
What remains of Providence's historic downtown core may, 
however, prove to be fundamental to growth. Indeed 
Providence, like Boston, is fortunate that its core area did 
not witness the blasphemous wholesale clearance in the 1960s 
and 1970s when the value of older buildings was not fully 
appreciated. The current legacy of fine Victorian buildings 
is an asset to attempts to promote downtown location of a 
variety of commercial uses. 
While the buildings have largely been retained, the 
activities which once inhabited them have gone through a 
period of sharp decline, only recently to have been countered 
by gradual resurgence. As retail businesses moved to 
suburban and fringe metropolitan locations, such as Cranston 
and Warwick, downtown began to empty out and to lose its 
identity as the single 'multi-purpose' center of the Rhode 
Island urban region. To the extent that there has been 
resurgence, it has been concentrated in those segments of the 
service sector which command a broad sphere of influence and 
a regionally based market. Business, high order services and 
government agencies predominate. 
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MAP 2.5 
THE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STUDY AREA 
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New highrise office structures have changed the old 
skyline around Kennedy Plaza. Empire Street and Lasalle 
Square provide recent contributions to the inventory of Class 
'A' Office Space (office spaces commanding a per square foot 
rent in excess of $15.00). This is. however. relatively 
little development for a city the size of Providence. while 
residual development appears to be taking place primarily by 
upgrading from within via rehabilitation projects. The 
market. therefore. appears still to be somewhat slack; even 
a number of the attractive spaces in the Fleet. Old Stone and 
Hospital Trust buildings remain vacant. 
This slow rate of current development can be attributed. 
for the most part. to dynamic growth in the more desirable 
locations of Boston. Hartford. Stanford and suburban New 
York. The nearby Boston metropolitan area. with its 
established commercial ribbon developments along Routes 
128 and 495. has probably constituted a severe constraint to 
growth in Providence. The key to a new downtown planning 
strategy is to tap into Boston's good fortune and to reap the 
unquestionable advantages Providence has to offer. 
particularly in respect to rents. congestion. accessibility. 
grade level public education. open · space and all round 
livability. 
Downtown districts 
For the purposes of inventorying development opportunity 
sites. geared to ameliorating the unyielding economic 
climate. downtown can be subdivided into a number of 
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districts, each with its own characteristics and problems. 
Map 2.6 shows the following subsections of downtown: Kennedy 
Plaza - in the northeast corner of the area, the plaza was 
recently reconstructed as the central terminal for Rhode 
Island Public Transportation Authority's bus operation; the 
Financial District - a striking collection of older off ice 
buildings in the center of which is located the struggling 
Arcade retail complex; the Providence Waterfront - including 
the newly designated Waterfront District, South Main Street 
and the RISD area; the Courthouse District - an area of 
marginal uses including parking garages and warehouses; 
Weybosset Hill - containing evidence of recent renewal and 
the fire-gutted Outlet Building; the Retail District -
bordered by Washington, Westminster and Weybosset Streets, 
containing an uneasy mix of abandoned lots cleared for 
parking, Westminster Mall, drug stores, bars and run-down 
office structures; the Capital Center Project Area - 60 acres 
of prime development land; the Jewelry District - a blend of 
four- to six-story brick manufacturing buildings and 
dilapidated offices; and, finally, Davol Square - the large 
scale private retail and office development yet to find a 
wholly adequate slot in the regional marketplace. 
Naturally. the pattern of decline has had different 
impacts on each of these areas. While concentrating 
primarily on the historic core (bounded by Dorrance. Empire, 
Fountain and Weybosset). the consultants were asked by the 
City to look to the issues affecting the wider downtown 
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MAP 2.6 
DOWNTOWN DISTRICTS 
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environment. Whether or not they proceeded to do so is the 
subject of Chapter 4. Whether or not what they selected to 
study was convincingly thorough is the subject of Chapter 5. 
2.6 Evidence enough to demand a new strategy 
With the benefits of intimacy conferred by local 
professional knowledge. the senior planning staff in 
Paolina's Administration were quite aware of the areal 
disparities across the city and increasingly aware of the 
district-to-district disparities which existed within 
downtown itself. Persuading the Mayor to adopt an active 
stance toward economic development was not a difficult task. 
The hiring of appropriate consultants and the setting of 
goals were different matters altogether. 
*** 
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"We have to make a fundamental decision. First. 
what is it we actually want to achieve? We have 
to make sure that we know what our objective is 
and that we then select the means that are 
appropriate to that objective." 
Henry Kissinger. 
Former U.S. Secretary of State. 
on Nicaragua. 1984 
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3.1 The need for consultants and a fresh approach 
The most cursory review of plans for downtown Providence 
since the early 1960s reveals a sad trend in local city 
planning. While. in every case. the presentation of 
contemporary social and economic environments is 
unquestionably thorough. only the vaguest hints at policy 
recommendations and methods of implementation are ventured. 
At present. under the experienced eye of Ms. Charlene 
Hall. former aide to Mayor Vincent Cianci and current 
Executive Director of the Capital Center Commission. the much 
publicized Capital Center Project is overseeing the removal 
of obsolete AMTRAK lines and the installation of a new urban 
infrastructure. This section of downtown. with its admirably 
comprehensive design review regulations. is already taken 
care of in terms of coordinated planning. Likewise. those 
areas on the immediate waterfront are incorporated into a new 
Waterfront District with designs already submitted and 
approved along the lines proposed by chief consulting 
architect. Mr. William Warner. 
For the reasons detailed in the previous chapter. both 
the oversights of the past and the ripeness of the current 
regional economic situation. begged a focus upon the long 
suffering historic core districts. An immediate decision was 
made by the Administration not to undertake the task of 
undertaking a development strategy 'in house'. The city's 
Director of Planning and Development is always first to 
acknowledge the lack of planning expertise among his regular 
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staff. The only qualified urban planner in the Department, 
Ms. Kathleen Field, finds herself occupied with the routine 
of day-to-day planning matters. Her commitment to long range 
planning is currently limited to updating land use maps and 
ordinance changes for neighborhood zoning, in association 
with her assistant Soo Dip Chin. 
Given the lack of technical ability in the pool of 
department staff, yet armed with well defined concepts with 
regard to the policy direction of the proposed strategy, 
Mayor Paolino and Arthur Markos decided to recruit the 
assistance of well qualified, highly experienced consultants. 
With a proposed budget in excess of $75,000 the 
Administration believed that soundly researched proposals 
would be forthcoming within a politically acceptable time 
frame. 
The selection of Carr, Lynch Associates in conjunction 
with Melvin Levine and Associates was based upon their 
satisfaction of a number of key criteria. First, the 
background of Steve Carr in downtown urban design projects 
and the professional market analysis work of Melvin Levine in 
association with the Rouse Corporation, commended their 
collaboration in a study for Providence which would demand 
the skills of both designer and economist. Second, the 
objectivity of a firm with no prior professional knowledge of 
the circumstances of downtown would ensure recommendations 
free from political contamination. All concerned parties 
were acutely aware of the city's, albeit unjust, reputation 
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for nepotism and bias in its exercise of policy 
implementation. Third, the small size of both Carr's and 
Levine's firms ensured the personal involvement of the 
characters interviewed. While research assistants would be 
employed in the gathering of data, plan and policy derivation 
would be handled by the key professionals hired. Subsequent 
relations between the Administration and the consulting 
consortium would be limited to meetings between the Mayor, 
his planning department Director, senior department staff, 
Steve Carr and Melvin Levine. 
3.2 Broad brush strokes: what did the City want? 
Given the existing conditions of downtown and the areal 
disparities within the core noted in Chapter 2 of this 
Research Project, the natural concentration of effort was 
envisaged to fall upon the historic core (as defined by Map 
2. 6) • The Administration drew the consultants' attention to 
the following issues and concerns: 
1. The vacancy rates existing in both Class 'A' and Class 
'B' spaces. 
2. Trends among development interests leading to proposed 
high quality, condominium type residential units. 
3. Poor physical infrastructure and streetscapes in the 
retail district. 
4. The limited demand for rehabilitated properties. 
5. The inadequacy of downtown as a citywide retail center. 
6. Westminster Mall's poor visibility to shoppers. 
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7. The absence of coordinated marketing and management 
for the downtown area. 
8. Traffic congestion, parking problems and the layout of 
the existing ring road system. 
9. Physical linkages and accessibility between Capital 
Center, the Waterfront District, the Court House 
District and Davol Square. 
10. The absence of downtown attractions and facilities for 
potential evening and weekend visitors or tourists. 
A broad summary of goals was furnished to support the 
Carr-Lynch-Levine research. Economic development issues were 
seen as paramount. Second, were the management and marketing 
of downtown as a unique neighborhood in which to live and 
conduct business. Third, were the desirable objectives of 
improved urban design and upgraded physical fabric. 
3.3 Study parameters set by the consultants 
As described, common ground was found between the 
Administration and Carr-Lynch-Levine in establishing a mapped 
study area (Map. 2.6). Briefly. this area focuses on those 
blocks between Empire and Dorrance, Fountain and Pine Streets 
- essentially the old retail core - since that was the area 
identified as being in greatest need of attention. For the 
purposes of integrating surrounding areas into long term 
goals. the study team also considered the districts 
associated with Capital Center. Kennedy Plaza, Union Station. 
Dyer Street (the waterfront) and the Jewelry District. 
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The consultants proceeded to establish a statement of 
purpose. a series of goals and a methodology of data 
collection tailored to the downtown study. 
The overall purpose of the Development Strategy 
was to make Providence "a better place in which to work. to 
do business. to live and enjoy life" (Carr-Lynch-Levine. 
1986). Commensurate with the wishes of the Administration. 
the statement of purpose in the strategy was refined to 
achieve the following by the year 2000: 
1. Attract new office growth first to locations within the 
historic core. to provide direct support for residential 
and retail development. 
2. Develop a downtown residential community large enough 
to create a positive evening and weekend presence on 
the streets. as well as an active group to advocate 
continued improvement. 
3. Restore downtown retail to its full potential based on 
office workers, and create a realistic increase in 
evening and weekend business based on city and suburban 
residents and visitors. 
4. Create a set of new attractions, complementing those 
already in downtown, in order · to increase evening and 
weekend activity. 
5. Create a management function capable of promoting the 
continued growth and well-being of the area. 
6. Revive the Westminster Mall as the central spine of 
downtown activity and as a street of pride for the 
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people of Providence. 
7. Facilitate the re-creation of a mixed use downtown 
waterfront between Dyer Street and the Providence River. 
8. Improve and reinforce the downtown ring roads for 
parking access, and provide publicly assisted structured 
parking adequate to support the projected hous i ng and 
office growth. 
The three broad goals specified for the downtown 
development effort were: 
1. To stimulate the development and occupancy of office 
space to accommodate the growth of existing firms and 
the needs of new firms attracted to Providence. 
2. To encourage the development of housing in rehabilitated 
structures, where appropriate, to accommodate the strong 
latent demand for housing in the downtown area. 
3. To encourage the expansion and sound merchandising of 
the retail/restaurant/service space in the downtown 
retail district and financial district to accommodate 
increases in downtown shopping by area residents 
attracted by celebrations, events and festivals 
arranged around a network of attractions. 
3.4 The consultants' methodology 
Most of the consultants' recommendations were based upon 
a commendably thorough data base inventory pertaining to a 
carefully selected zone within the study area: the Downtown 
Development District (Map 3.1). Data was also collected, 
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though less comprehensively. for Fringe Districts within the 
study area (Map 3.1). Recommendations in the Carr-Lynch-
Levine Development Strategy apply most directly. therefore. 
to the Downtown Development District. 
The collection of primary and secondary data for 
assembly in the published data base was conducted in two 
ways: first. a review of secondary social. demographic. 
and economic data. as well as an analysis of past land use 
and policy plans; second. the execution of two primary data 
collection exercises - a downtown land use inventory and a 
market analysis which included a downtown employee survey. 
A descriptive analysis of the consultants' findings is 
presented in the following chapter. 
the report are made in Chapter 5. 
*** 
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PROPOSALS FOR ADDRESSING DECLINE: 
A SYNOPSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF 
THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
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"The key components of the strategy will be 
financial and institutional inventions. The 
superstructure for a vital, successful 
downtown is mostly there. With aggressive 
management it can be filled with renewed 
activity." 
Carr-Lynch-Levine, 1986 
"My vision of a new residential neighborhood 
in the heart of downtown can be a reality" 
Mayor Joseph R. Paolino, Jr •• 1986 
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4.1 Structure of the report 
Consisting of 161 pages. the Providence Downtown 
~-------- --------
Q~vel~E~~E! ~!E~!~~y is divided into eight chapters and three 
appendices. Following the logical succession of planning 
research methodology. an assessment is given of existing 
conditions and then. after a summary of the proposed 'Overall 
Development Strategy'. recommendations are submitted for 
retail development. housing development and an attractions 
strategy. The final chapter gives a future scenario of 'The 
Future Downtown'. detailing the expected physical. social and 
economic outcomes of the policy recommendations. The 
appendices summarize the methodology and results of the 
market analysis and employment survey. as well as provide 
acknowledgements to study participants and advisors. 
4.2 Major elements of the Development Strategy 
Before analyzing implementational aspects of the 
Strategy in respect to planning. funding and management. the 
elements of the Carr-Lynch-Levine report. by functional area. 
are briefly summarized. Page numbers in this and the 
following chapter - are cited to correspond with the Strategy 
as presented to the City of Providence in March. 1986. For 
the better orientation of the reader. the consultants' 
graphics for existing and proposed land uses in the historic 
core are furnished (Maps 4.1 and 4.2). 
Retail development 
The historic core contains 238.000 square feet of 
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shoppers' goods stores (including apparel, furniture and 
miscellaneous retail). as well as 210,000 square feet of 
convenience stores and services (including eating and 
drinking places). The shoppers' goods stores are focussed on 
Westminster and Weybosset Streets, between Dorrance and 
Mathewson. Most of the full service restaurants are located 
on or within a block of Washington Street, between Dorrance 
and Mathewson. The consultants found that shoppers' goods 
stores and the restaurants combined derive 70 to 80 percent 
of their sales from downtown employees (Market Analysis, 
Appendix 1, p.133). 
There are no department stores remaining in the downtown 
area. Department stores typically attract about half of all 
dollars expended in downtown retail establishments (Melvin 
Levine, 1986). The addition of a department store or a 
collection of associated stores in a department store-like 
development (similar to that proposed for the recently fire 
damaged Outlet Building), was seen by the consultants as 
constituting a "quantum-step increase in expenditures by 
downtown employees and in shopping trips to downtown by city 
and suburban residents." 
The retail development strategy calls for the type of 
management to be found in suburban shopping malls. Based 
upon t e land use inventory and the employee survey, 
essential components for retail success were established as: 
1. An upscale department store. 
2. More apparel stores. 
3. An attractive. secure and well-maintained Westminster 
Mall. 
4. Improved parking. 
5. More attractions downtown on weekends for area residents 
and visitors. 
The tasks of the agency to be charged with executing the 
Strategy. in respect to retail growth. can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Work with owners of vacant stores and of stores at key 
locations to bring in first class apparel and specialty 
stores with a view to strengthening retail links 
between the Arcade and Dorrance Street and along both 
Westminster and Weybosset Streets. 
2. Direct the conversion of Westminster Mall to a festival 
place with improved pavement. lighting. signs. awnings. 
and exhibit/performing places. 
3. Work with restaurant owners along Washington Street to 
make their operations more inviting to patrons. 
4. Work with retail. restaurant and entertainment facility 
managers to create a parking validation system that 
essentially would offer free parking to clients in 
the evenings and at weekends. 
5. Work with retail store managers and property owners to 
create an operations manual for the Downtown Retail 
District. Create and seek the adoption of a model 
retail lease for future retail tenants that would embody 
the provisions of the operations manual. 
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- Housing development 
A strong residential neighborhood in the downtown area 
would provide a strong sense of 'community' and the 
continuous presence of people. around the clock. would make 
the center of Providence come alive at weekends. Perhaps 
more importantly. there would be a lobby for safety. 
cleanliness and amenities. 
The projects identified by the Strategy. which add up to 
over 1.800 units. are geared to middle and upper-middle 
income individuals and families and are identified as 
potentials for six sites in the Planning Area as follows: 
1. The Retail Core - The rehabilitation of the Shepard's 
Building (170 units). the Outlet Company (320 units). 
Westminster East (130 units) and Westminster West 
(50 units). 
2. Weybosset Hill - The rehabilitation of the Caesar Misch 
Building and surrounding area into a proposed 'Weybosset 
Crescent Project' (120 units) for which a prototype 
model is detailed (p.105). 
3. The Courthouse District - The development of three 
currently disused industrial structures in 'The Art 
Factory' (150 units) for occupancy by city artists. 
4. Kennedy Plaza - The construction of two housing towers 
on Parcel 1 of the Capital Center Project (80 units in 
each tower). as well as the conversion of the old Union 
Station into luxury condominiums (160 units). 
5. Waterfront District - The construction of luxury 
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condominiums with views to the new Waterfront Park 
(160 units). 
6. Capital Center - The construction of high income 
townhouses or garden apartments (40 units). 
7. Jewelry District - Over a period of ten years. the 
development of rental and owner-occupied residences 
(500 units) in both new construction and rehabilitation. 
Attractions strategy 
A major goal of the Downtown Development Strategy is the 
reawakening of downtown Providence during the evenings and 
weekends. Key to this goal is attracting visitors. residents 
from Providence's neighborhoods and downtown workers. Five 
proposed attractions are ventured to complement existing 
centers of activity. 
The proposed attractions are of two kinds: first. 
cultural. entertainment and educational attractions housed in 
buildings; second. programs or events to be organized and 
held at various locations. including festivals. fairs. 
concerts and outdoor performances. 
attractions are as follows: 
The five proposed 
1. A revitalized retail/restaurant/entertainment district 
that would include: an improved streetscape and new 
festival lighting; streetscape and lighting improvements 
on Washington Street and Union Street; and a new 
Entertainment Center. linking Washington to Westminster 
Mall (including a restaurant and cinemas). 
2. A theme exhibit. such as an historic railroad engine. 
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along with performance facilities in Kennedy Plaza, 
and demountable festival exhibit structures in the 
Fleet Building Galleria. 
3. An appropriately themed stage setting and performance 
facilities and equipment in Cathedral Square for 
celebrations and festival events, to be funded in 
association with a local sponsor or sponsors. 
4. An Art Factory to be developed in association with 
housing considerations which would consist of 
exhibit and sales studios for artists, sculptors and 
craftspersons with interior and exterior space for 
related entertainment activities. 
5. A theme exhibit, such as an historic coastal steamer, 
tied to an appropriately designed restaurant/retail 
attraction on the waterfront, also to be undertaken 
with assistance from sponsors. 
The locations of existing and proposed attractions are 
shown in Map 4.3. 
The future downtown 
The consultants anticipate that implementation of their 
Strategy will result in a very different downtown by the year 
2000. Noting that we are now closer to the year 2000 than to 
the year 1970 and that incredible changes have occurred in 
Providence in the period 1960 to 1986, Steve Carr (1986) 
notes that his perspective on achievable change is a feasible 
one. If their recipe for growth is followed he firmly 
believes that, "The core will once again be the vibrant 
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center of the city's economic and cultural life. It will be 
a pleasant and exciting place to live. work and play. It 
will once again be the pride of its citizens". The 
consultants expect to see the following in place by the turn 
of the next century: 
1. Westminster Street will be revived as the active spine 
of downtown: 
brick street. 
a simple. elegant and colorful tree-lined 
At midday and on many weekends it will be 
filled with crowds of shoppers. enjoying a renewed 
retail district. 
2. The upper floors throughout the old retail core will 
once again be filled. the predominant use being 
residential rather than commercial. Downtown office 
workers. students and the elderly will add immeasurably 
to the quality of the street life. helping it to seem 
safe. clean and orderly. 
3. Weybosset will continue to be a strong street and 
become more so with the construction of Weybosset 
Crescent and the filling of the upper floors with 
housing. The Outlet development will replace a present 
major 'dead spot' with new life. The Arcade office 
development will provide continuity between the two 
districts. retail and financial. 
4. Washington Street will continue in its role as a support 
street with bus traffic and parking structures. but it 
will be softened by trees. Restaurants will develop in 
even greater numbers. the new structures having windows 
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and canopies adding color to the scene. 
5. A new ring of attractions will be in place, surrounding 
the old core, each linked to new developments. Next to 
the existing Civic Center will be a Convention Center, 
linked, in turn, to a new convention hotel and a 900 
car parking garage. 
6. Kennedy Plaza will be the major focus for downtown 
celebration, hosting several fairs and festivals each 
summer, as well as a Winterfest. A train exhibit will 
add interest to the Plaza, linked through specialty 
retail to the waterfront and Capital Center. The 
Fleet Galleria will provide a setting for changing 
exhibits and performances and will extend the weekend 
festivals inside. 
7. River relocation will be complete and the city will have 
a handsome new waterfront, as well as improved 
circulation in the core. The Dyer/Eddy interchange with 
I-195 will have been reconstructed to open the city's 
old dock area to a mixed redevelopment of restaurants, 
luxury housing, highrise offices and shops. 
8. Another focal point will be the Art Factory at Pine and 
Richmond Streets. Here, in converted factory buildings 
will be a rich mix of artists' studios, exhibit spaces 
and a restaurant. This complex will build on the 
presence of RISD's faculty and students and Providence's 
rich tradition in the arts. Other housing will cluster 
around giving a 'mini-Soho' type atmosphere. 
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9. The Jewelry District will take off as more and more 
people seek to move back into the desirable downtown 
area. This area has the potential for creating several 
thousand more housing units. initially in converted 
factories and then in townhouse development. 
10. Access and circulation will be much improved by the work 
at the Dyer/Eddy interchange and on the ring road. 
Modest improvements to other arterial streets. such as 
trees and sidewalk repaving. will attract commercial 
activity. built on increased vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic. 
The following section looks at how Carr-Lynch-Levine 
hoped to bring about this idealistic. but desirable. future 
downtown. 
4.3 Planning. funding and management 
Perhaps even more important than the substantive 
elements of the Development Strategy are the recommendations 
for its implementation. The consultants paid as much 
attention to planning techniques. funding schemes and 
strategy management as the actual physical and economic plans 
themselves. A number of innovative schemes were proposed as 
vehicles for successful goal attainment. 
Management: The Providence Company 
Section II of this thesis dwells at length upon the 
implications of and alternatives for a new management agency 
for downtown Providence. The prototype proposed by Carr-
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Lynch-Levine is seen as the "principal energizing element of 
the strategy". For this reason. the Department of Planning 
and Development interpreted this key proposal as the most 
significant and far-reaching of the Strategy's findings 
(Arthur Markos. interview. July. 1986). 
According to the prototype model. the Providence Company 
would be a non-profit private entity that would provide 
development packaging and management services for the 
Downtown Planning Area. It would operate as an arm of the 
planning department. providing services to and operating 
programs in the Downtown Planning Area on a contract basis 
with City agencies and private firms. 
Policy direction would be provided by a Board of 
Directors comprised of public officials. downtown business 
persons. and private and civic leaders appointed by the 
Mayor. The Providence Company would employ a professional 
staff to manage the several action strategies proposed in the 
report. It would receive financial support for its operating 
expenses and programs from a Downtown Tax Increment District 
to be set up by the Department of Planning and Development. 
The Company would provide development coordination and 
development packaging services directly by its professional 
staff; it would direct advertising and promotional campaigns; 
it would supervise maintenance and security services (on a 
contract basis); and it would directly control expenses 
associated with Westminster Mall. In short. it would be the 
principal means of direct Strategy implementation. 
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Public improvements 
In addition to the plans for retail, commercial, housing 
and attractions, several related improvements to the public 
environment and downtown image are proposed (p.51). 
Substantial treatment is outlined for: retail streets 
(Westminster Mall, Union Street, and Washington Street); the 
ring road (including the repair of Pine and Friendship 
Streets, widening of sidewalks and a bolder, more visible 
graphic identification of the ring road system); parking 
structures (principally in terms of renovation, expansion and 
upgrading of existing garages); and the waterfront area 
(following the improvements to the Dyer/Eddy interchange, all 
improvements concur with William Warner's Waterfront Plan). 
Zoning and design review 
According to the Strategy. modifications in downtown 
zoning will also require action (p.55). As suggested by Haar 
and Horowitz (1984), downtown zoning should encourage the 
fine grain mix of off ices, housing and retail adopted by the 
Strategy. The consultants support the City's intention to 
re-zone the entire downtown core as a C-3 Downtown Commercial 
Zone (a zone which would permit all uses in C-2. as well as 
those in R-4. with only use and not area controls) which 
would promote mixed use and place no physical limitations on 
downtown housing. 
Parking and servicing requirements should also support 
the increasing density of downtown. The Strategy proposes a 
lower parking space per square foot ratio for new 
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construction in conjunction with substantial financial 
assistance to support future parking development. Aware of 
the somewhat conservative nature of the city's politics. the 
report does not recommend that any special incentive bonuses 
or sophisticated provisions such as TDR (transferable 
development rights) or linkage schemes would be appropriate. 
In respect to design review (always a controversial 
matter). the Mayor is urged to establish a new entity. 
separate from the proposed Providence Company. which would 
review major development projects, specifically those that 
affect the historic character of downtown. as well as those 
exceeding specified magnitudes of development and those to be 
built in prominent locations. The Design Review Committee 
would be composed of five to ten members and be 
representative of each design profession (architecture. 
landscape architecture. planning. urban design and 
engineering). the development community. the historic 
preservation interests. and the Department of Planning and 
Development. Recommendations would be made to the Mayor and 
to the D.P.D. as to the approval. modification. need for 
further review. or disapproval of design projects. 
Phasing 
For the sake of convenience and practicality. the 
Strategy would be implemented in three phases. each of five 
years. The consultants are aware that flexibility will be 
necessary as the type and rate of development proposals (the 
response of the private sector) are assessed. The report 
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suggests that the phasing will "serve as a guide to the 
operations of the Providence Company and the D.P.D. and as an 
illustration of what is possible" (p.60). 
Briefly, Phase I (1986-1990) calls for concentration of 
effort upon the Retail District with particular emphasis upon 
Westminster Mall. Projects such as the Outlet, Shepard's, 
the Entertainment Center and Weybosset Crescent would be 
initiated. Concomitantly, would be the completion of the 
Lasalle Square office development, ground breaking for 
parking structures on Washington and Fountain Streets, the 
initiation of the Attractions Strategy and the establishment 
of the Providence Company. 
Phase II (1990-1995) would see a major emphasis upon 
downtown housing, particularly in the middle- to upper 
middle-income sectors. Upper floor conversions would 
predominate. In addition, there would be an emerging market 
for luxury condominiums in the tower at Union Station and on 
the Dyer Street Waterfront. The absorption of office space 
in both Class 'A' and 'B' structures would pick up speed, 
while retail expansion would take the form of 30,000 square 
feet of infill on Westminster Mall. Two new attractions 
would be added: the Arts Factory and the Waterfront Theme 
Park, the latter to include an historic steamship exhibit. 
Phase III (1995-2000) predicts 420 units of housing 
developed in more peripheral areas of downtown such as the 
Waterfront, Capital Center and the Jewelry District. 700,000 
square feet of office space would be occupied, 600,000 square 
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feet of it in new structures in Capital Center and on Dyer 
Street. The retail component of Union Station would be 
completed (60,000 square feet) together with a new apparel 
anchor at Westminster and Snow (30,000 square feet). Parking 
structures for 1,600 new spaces would be built next to the 
Courthouse and the new waterfront office building. 
- Program costs 
The Providence Company - the key vehicle of 
implementation for the Strategy - would be activated on a 
full-time basis in 1987. Its operating budget for the first 
year would be $660,000 plus a one-time capital allowance of 
$40,000 to cover furniture, furnishings and equipment, giving 
a total of $700,000 (Carr-Lynch-Levine, 1986). The operating 
budget would increase by one percent per year to annual 
amount of $751,000 in the year 2000. Total cumulative cost 
for the agency over 14 years, including interest, would be 
$9,977,000. 
The Providence Company would oversee and coordinate the 
development of the following: the Attractions Strategy (at a 
cost of $4,000,000); the ten parking garages (at a cost of 
$27,086,000); and the ring road improvements (at a cost of 
$500,000). The total operating ' co~ts of the Providence 
Company and the above outlays, plus debt service for all 
improvements through the year 2000, would be $31,032,000. 
These total costs would be supported largely through tax 
increment income from new development over the fifteen year 
period in the sum of $26,611,000. An additional $2,406,000 
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would be derived from the increase in value to be generated 
from revaluation. The remaining $2.015.000 would be derived 
from common area or promotion payments by retail 
establishments as new leases are concluded starting in 1993. 
The Downtown Planning Area would correspond to the new Tax 
Increment Financing District starting in 1986. Assuming 
activation of the Providence Company in 1987. the Development 
Strategy Program would begin to incur costs a year in advance 
of potential supporting income from T.I.F •. Temporary 
anticipation notes would therefore be necessary for a period 
of up to three years in advance of the tax increment process. 
Table 4.1 is a detailed summary of the Development Strategy 
Financing Program as developed for the report. 
4.4 Anticipated community benefits 
The Downtown Development Strategy. initiated and managed 
by the Providence Company in the manner proposed by the Carr-
Lynch-Levine study. claims to generate the following 
substantial benefits for the City of Providence and its 
residents: 
1. Employment - More than 12.000 jobs would be added in 
offices, stores. service establishments. institutions 
and other developments in the Downtown Planning Area 
the year 2000 (an average increase of more than 800 
per year over 15 years). 
2. Construction - More than $200.000.000 of new 
construction and rehabilitation would be put in place 
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by 
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in the Downtown Planning Area by the year 2000 (an 
average of more than $13,300,000 a year over 15 years). 
3. Retail/Restaurant Sales - This sector would increase 
from approximately $50,000,000 in 1985 to $100,000,000 
in the year 2000 (1985 dollar value). Expenditures per 
employee would increase as a result of broadening 
shopping opportunities, and the number of employees 
would increase as demand from a wider market area 
grows. 
4. Property Values and Tax Income - Approximately 
$5,000,000 per year in additional property tax income 
would flow to the City by the year 2000, generated by 
new development and by conversion of vacant commercial 
space to residential use. Additional property tax 
income would be generated by the current revaluation 
program and by the proposed downtown tax increment. 
5. The Downtown Neighborhood - A final benefit, not 
directly quantifiable, would be the creation of a 
multi-faceted downtown neighborhood: more people in 
the streets in non-office hours and more young, 
energetic individuals who will be educated and therefore 
constitute a strong lobby for safety, services and 
sensible management. 
These recommendations and anticipated benefits combine 
to paint a rosy picture of future downtown life. But, as in 
any planning document, there are flaws. Whether or not these 
flaws will deter the Administration from embracing the report 
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wholeheartedly is the subject of a personal response to the 
consultants' work in the following chapter. 
*** 
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CHAPTER 5 
A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF THE STRATEGY ON ITS FACE: 
A PERSONAL RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTANTS' REPORT 
80 
"The city has fallen prey to an attitude that can 
be called urban Darwinism the survival of only 
the most lucrative use of any given plot of land." 
Paul Goldberger. 1982 
"Was it ever the intention of our city planners to 
have a downtown in which every block seems to be 
developed to its utmost financial potential?" 
David Smith. 1980 
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5.1 The context for criticism 
Planners are no different from others operating within 
the urban scene in that they are subject to continuous 
change. They are different in that they are a specialized 
component of public policy charged with intervening in the 
process of change to mould the urban scene in the public 
interest. 
This matter of intervention is a contentious one. To 
what extent intervention will take place is subject to the 
political and economic climates. as well as to prevailing 
public opinion. 
In the current mood of the New Conservatism. local 
government is constrained on the one hand by containment and 
contraction in intergovernmental revenue exchange and. on the 
other. by a private sector whose good health promotes 
development. 
Coordinating public redevelopment strategies and the 
ambitions of the market in order to bring about positive 
change in central cities is no more and no less than a 
balancing act. Coaxing the market to perform in the public 
interest demands of the planner unique skills in the 
mobilization of diverse actors and resources. Whether or not 
the QowE!£~E R££Yi~~E£~ Q~y~l£E~~E! ~!E~!~gy enhances that 
City's ability to generate growth in its core. not only for 
the developers but for the citizenry at large. is the subject 
of this chapter; an analysis and critique. 
The analysis attempts to remain within the confines of 
82 
the Strategy and the contextual setting of downtown 
Providence. The assumption is made at the outset that one 
does not need to know the 'universe'. However, where the 
observation suggests weaknesses in underlying constructs, 
arguments for alternative approaches venture into the realms 
of social and economic externalities. 
An effort is made to lead all suggestions and 
recommendations back to their applicability to downtown. In 
order to do this, a question is posed as guarantor: How will 
any additional information or further analyses, overlooked by 
the consultants, help the Mayor and his executive advisors in 
promoting downtown redevelopment and future management? 
5.2 An orientation of opinions 
The parameters set by the consulting firm determine the 
goals they set for themselves and, therefore, for the City. 
It is one aim of this chapter to state the assumptions of the 
Development Strategy and to critique them. 
Such a critique will be colored by the preconceptions, 
mind set and knowledge of the critic. It is hoped that the 
biases will be apparent and need not be set down here. 
effort is both an intuitive and substantiated attempt to 
clarify a personal response to the Strategy. 
5.3 The development of the Strategy. an overview 
The scope of the report 
Carr, Lynch Associates have set down clearly the 
This 
parameters of their study. " ... its focus has been on the 
historic core: that area bounded by the highways and the 
river". 
An analysis of existing conditions comprehensively 
describes current physical and socio-economic characteristics 
of Downtown in well-defined functional areas. A sub-section. 
'Development Plans. Trends and Opportunities' (pp.23-27) 
looks at the processes of change. 
While Carr. Lynch state that their concentration is upon 
the office worker market. they also note that downtown "will 
not come fully alive and prosper on this market alone". The 
question is raised. therefore. why did the financial analysis 
performed by Melvin Levine Associates concentrate solely on 
this limited. existing market? 
The omission of further research in this area is no 
doubt based upon the prior experiences of the consultants. 
However. of the three broad 'Goals of the Strategy' (p.47). 
one is devoted to "increased shopping by area residents •.. " 
It is felt that the implicit assumptions of the document 
that there is a citywide or regional market to be tapped (no 
matter how marginal in anticipated impact). without further 
investigation. borders on conjecture. 
Without establishing the precise role of downtown 
Providence as a retail and service center. it might be 
difficult to convince major business concerns to locate and 
to make the physical improvements. particularly in respect to 
accessibility and parking. necessary to attract a wider 
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market. 
We do not need to know the 'universe'. It is a fact 
that Warwick has become the retail capital of Rhode Island 
with a sphere of influence across much of the state (refer to 
the economic analysis in Chapter 2). While avoiding the 
hypothetical constructs of complex location theories. it 
might have been appropriate for the consultants to have 
conducted an analysis of: 
(a) The goods and services offered by Warwick; 
(b) A tax base analysis. over time. to establish 
the changing patterns of revenues; 
(c) The market pull factor in terms of distance-decay; 
(d) A Nearest Neighbor Analysis using Reilly's Coefficient 
to establish the breakpoint of markets between 
Providence and Warwick. 
While these methodologies are far from complex. they 
might help to establish: 
(a) The current role of Providence in the pattern of retail 
trade; 
(b) Whether Providence fulfills a regional role in the 
provision of goods and services. and in what sectors; 
(c) Whether Providence is being bypassed by consumers in the 
north of the state in their selection of Warwick; 
(d) The role of malls in redefining the role of the central 
city in an urbanized state; 
(e) Clarification of the most appropriate response by the 
City to the prevailing economy in maximizing outcomes 
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of public monies expended on redevelopment efforts; 
(f) Avoidance of duplication of service provision in areas 
Providence is not financially/fiscally able to compete. 
Rhode Island does not have powers to plan on a truly 
regional basis. Municipalities are in direct competition one 
with another. despite the fact that they are all components 
of the same urban system. Interstate highways are linear. 
The succession of individual economies along them is not. 
In order to make the report's goals more relevant to a 
secure economic future downtown and to establish a scope such 
that regional trends are understood and encompassed by 
proposed strategies. a limited regional economic analysis 
might have been useful. At present. the summarized impacts 
of the Strategy are not convincing (pp.6-7). Rather than 
merely suggest that. "This is the kind of process which we 
have seen in Boston and many other cities". the consultants 
ought to be encouraged to confirm their assumptions. 
The City needs to know more. The scope must be 
broadened to facilitate efficient planning. 
The Overall Development Strategy 
In his secon~ 'State of the City Address' (1986). Mayor 
Joseph R. Paolino. Jr. indicated that despite recent 
attention upon downtown. his administration would never 
forsake the neighborhoods: "Those whose interests lie in 
downtown development must understand the depth of our 
commitment to the neighborhoods". 
Nowhere in the report is there a reference to downtown 
86 
Providence's role as a component element of a citywide urban 
system. The core is viewed as a self-contained entity. 
Perhaps even more serious than the regional deficiencies 
detailed above, then, is an absence of research in respect to 
the functional relationship between the core and surrounding 
areas of the City of Providence. This relationship is the 
outcome of processes operating throughout the historic 
development of Providence and is recognized by the Rhode 
Island Historical Preservation Commission, which stated in 
its Downtown Providence Report of 1981, "The Downtown Survey 
[of historic buildings and landmarks] must further be viewed 
in a city-wide context ••• ". recognizing the interdependence 
and continuity of functional development in the city's 
geographic districts. 
Downtown areas have seen their role either supplanted or 
subsumed by suburban or urban fringe developments, 
particularly in the manufacturing and retail sectors 
(Friedman, 1981). But, as Susan Feinstein has noted (1981), 
there is something more than a residual role performed by the 
core in its servicing of the needs of residents of inner city 
neighborhoods. The report neither acknowledges nor builds on 
the existing and potential Providence markets. 
In making unsubstantiated assumptions about the 
insignificance of both intra- and inter-city market trends 
and patterns, the Strategy is lacking in its analysis of the 
city's economic base. Doubts may therefore be raised as to 
the accuracy of its future scenarios and financial specifics. 
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By insularising its 'Overall Development Strategy'. the 
analysis concentrates on maximizing the response of the 
existing private sector economy to significant public sector 
activity. The development strategy is thorough enough within 
the confines of its limited ambition. but the sum of its 
parts gives few guarantees to those who might have doubts 
about assumption reliability. An underlying assumption. 
for example. might be that certain 'knock-on' effects of the 
thriving Boston economy would be felt in Providence. 
so. but to what extent1 
The plan of action 
Quite 
The operational aspects of the report have been well 
thought out. The proposed Providence Company and the 
detailed 'Action Strategies' (p.48) show astuteness in the 
area of phased policy. in terms of broad theory if not in the 
specifics of application. 
Particularly reassuring is the notion of employing a 
professional staff to support the activities of the 
Providence Company. Financial advice from qualified bankers 
and realtors. for example. would be crucial in helping plans 
win support from the business community. Such external 
expertise would complement the knowledge of the Department of 
Planning and Development which. perhaps wisely. would have 
some control over the allocation of program funding. 
according to the consultants' model (p.48. para.4). 
The hierarchical linkages between public. private and 
public-private agencies certainly deal with potential 
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accusations of venturism, but it is possible that the already 
comprehensive supply of administrative units would become 
somewhat top-heavy should another be created (see Chapter 6 
for a more detailed analysis of this potential problem). The 
roles of the City and the Department of Planning and 
Development in the implementation of the strategies remain a 
little ambiguous. They appear to have the ability to act as 
a check. Should not they be more active? 
While much emphasis is placed upon an anticipated 
positive response from the private sector, the related public 
improvements and actions (pp.51-57) to improve misjudged 
design decisions of the past and to create a more seductive 
physical fabric in the future are indeed impressive. The new 
treatment for Westminster Mall, the execution of a free-
flowing ring road system and the use of tax increment 
financing for servicing debts on parking structures are both 
timely and location-appropriate policies. These schemes, 
when viewed in map and plan form, appear intelligently 
logical solutions to physical problems which have become 
compounded over time. It is in these areas that public 
monies might most efficaciously be disposed of, given the 
anticipated response of the private sector. 
5.4 Elements of the report 
This chapter is not intended to be damning. However, in 
retrospect (and it is hoped there would be no such need), 
should the Strategy fail to hold solutions to the downtown 
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economy, this student would not recommend that policy makers 
look back through its pages for alternative wisdom. 
The 'bottom line' solution is getting more people 
with more dollars downtown. Whether or not the consultants' 
recommendations will help to do this is the subject of a 
critique of the program elements. Having commented upon the 
validity of the scope and goals of Carr, Lynch Associates' 
work and generalized about subject matter and coverage, 
specific schemes are now reviewed in the light of negative 
statements already made about the market analysis. 
Bright lights and colorful canopies 
The 'Disneyland Gambit' is to be played in Downtown 
Providence. A potential developer of the Outlet Store 
property proposes an enclosed mall as a specialty retail 
center. 
The moderate successes of the Arcade and the Davol 
Square developments are to be translated into a centrally 
located festival-type market area with the unreserved 
endorsement of the report. But where are the figures? It is 
clear to all who live and work downtown that there are times 
of the day when the core is dead. Evening and weekend 
activities exhibit a paucity which belies the term central 
city. There is no defined historical background or specified 
linkage of the proposed mall with any other current or 
proposed activity, nor does the retail strategy consider 
potential linkages with possible attractions on the new 
Waterfront or within the Capital Center area. Once again 
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there is a problem of isolating sites from the market. 
The market itself is not specified other than in the term. 
"area residents". The question might be posed. "Can downtown 
Providence support two or more specialty store/festival-type 
developments?" The report ought to specify who the new 
tenants might be and what clientele they might attract. 
The proposed development of an entertainment complex 
more directly addresses the problem of an empty core. This 
would undoubtedly be a pull factor to area residents and 
heighten the profile of downtown. Bright lights lend warmth 
and identity to a central zone. Coupled with the 
recommendations for working with restauranteurs. 
entertainment proprietors and retail businessmen to improve 
facades and signage (p.84). as well as the elements in the 
physical design proposals. the report's concentration on 
revamping the night-time tone of the area appears both valid 
and workable. 
Offices. offices everywhere 
Considering the extent to which the economy is assumed 
to rely on a thriving office sector. it is perhaps surprising 
that. while housing and retail activity are deemed worthy of 
separate chapters. off ice development is inserted as a series 
of sub-sections (p.31. p.40). Yet. the first goal of the 
report is to "Attract new office growth to locations within 
the core. as a first priority" (p.2). 
This anomaly aside. it is surprising that the 
cornerstone of Carr. Lynch/Mel Levine's Development Strategy 
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does not examine the existing office economy, let alone 
provide a profile of likely future clients, in anything but 
the vaguest terms. Vacancy rates and absorption rates are 
not placed in an historical setting. It is not clear whether 
Class B absorption rates are low because there is no demand 
or because of poor structure condition (p.31, para.1). There 
are current vacancies. The combined current absorption rate 
of Class A and Class B spaces "has been proceeding at rates 
of 100,000 to 200,000 square feet per year". This vagueness 
is carried through to the sub-section titled, Phasing, where 
it is recognized that Class B office space is currently over-
supplied and that, "the amount of new space added in the 
first phase is about half of what can be added in later 
phases". One is left wondering what economic event is going 
to precede the ability of downtown Providence to support 
large increases in office space. 
What about those individuals who owned the now vacant 
Class B spaces? Where are they now? Why should they and 
others like them come downtown? 
- A pleasant place for people to live 
The six major areas designated for residential 
development are well chosen. It is refreshing to see the 
promotion of residential uses in the retail core (p.98). The 
proposed rehabilitation of the Shepard's building and the 
upper floors of the Outlet Company will contribute to a 
stronger presence outside office hours. 
The upper floors along Westminster Mall are thought to 
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be of some value as residences. but there is no 
substantiation of this. The over-concentration on luxury 
condominium developments and costly conversion dwellings will 
change the flavor of downtown and greatly inflate property 
values. However. the housing strategy does address the need 
to maximize space utilization. given the shortfalls in 
anticipated land take-up during the earlier phases of the 
project. 
It is recognized and accepted that the consultants did 
not see themselves as social engineers in any philanthropic 
sense of the term. But given the City's ability to influence 
land use patterns. it is hoped that the administration would 
look beyond the optimization of developers' profit margins by 
providing incentives to less exclusive residential 
development. The homeless problem in Providence will worsen 
considerably and the "urban Darwinism" feared by Goldberger 
become a reality if the public sector does not stem 
profiteering in land speculation. The fault does not lie 
\ with individual developers. Neither should they be 
discouraged from participating fully in the redevelopment of 
downtown Providence. Rather. a more balanced approach to 
residential construction should be derived whereby outcomes 
include both private profit and a mix of dwellings. Planners 
should remind themselves that while their first priority 
might be to patch up the city's financial structure. they 
have a duty to the wider public interest. 
The Mayor and his department directors should be 
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encouraged to promote an assessment of housing need - both 
for low income as well as upper income dwellings - to 
underwrite and complement the stated perceptions of likely 
market provision. 
The mechanisms for leveraging alternative funding are 
excellently presented (p.110) and should indeed be 
incorporated into the strategy for residential development. 
5.5 Conclusions: a personal reaction of guarded optimism 
With something bordering on guarded optimism. the City 
of Providence should be encouraged to embrace the general 
tenet of the Strategy. Its stance is one of realism at a 
time when public funds are restricted. The City has many 
responsibilities and must allocate its monies equitably among 
valid competing interests. 
The major reservations expressed in this chapter implore 
the City to participate in on-going research into the role of 
Providence and its most appropriate future development. This 
does not mean that Phase I of the plan should not go ahead as 
specified in the document. Not knowing the 'universe' is 
part and parcel of public decision-making. Yet there should 
be moves toward reduced dependence on the market to bring 
about growth. The City ought never to allow itself to become 
a pawn in its own plan. The issues over the roles of the 
public and private sectors being hammered out in discussions 
over the Capital Center project should be brought to bear on 
downtown itself. How sad it would be if the good intentions 
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of the current administration were frust r ated by the equally 
well-intentioned private sector's desire to earn for its 
shareholders a handsome return. 
Let not the words at the opening of Chapter 8 in the 
report (p.119) be repeated at the turn of the next century: 
"Despite all this positive activity, the long awaited 
downtown renaissance is not yet dramatically visible. 
there is a sense in the old retail core of continuing 
Indeed 
decline, with a few bright spots. Why is this so? •.•••• " 
*** 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE EXISTING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE 
IN DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE 
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"A peculiar combination of provincialism and 
pride seemed to hold the city back •.• " 
"Mayor Cianci was forced from off ice after 
being convicted of assaulting a contractor 
whom he suspected was carrying on an affair 
with his estranged wife ••• Joseph R. Paolino, 
Jr., 30, squeaked into City Hall after 
winning a hotly contested special election 
by 12 votes ••• " 
Caroline Knapp and Peter Kadzis, 1986 
on politics and development in Providence 
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6.1 Relevance of the existing milieu to planning 
It has been the experience of researchers conducting 
empirical studies of planners and their environments, that 
planners often avoid conflict and controversy by invoking the 
obscure ethics of rational objectivity. Rabinovitz (1967) 
notes: "Although the addition of roles required for 
implementation may be only an adjunct to other conflicts 
between the skills needed by planners and the requirements of 
professionalism, it does not appear that even if the resource 
potential of planners for exerting influence is substantial, 
their disposition to use these resources in the political 
arena is limited". 
Before assessing the impact of the fro~i~~Q£~ Q£~Q!£~Q 
Q~~~1££~~Q! ~!~~!~gy upon the Administration's planning 
professionals (the theme of Section II), a summary is 
provided here of the structure of planning and management 
agencies currently operating downtown, as well as an 
assessment of why another agency might be needed. 
Such an overview is considered essential to an understanding 
of the mechanisms for review and adoption (Chapters 7 through 
10 of this thesis) and paramount to evaluating alternative 
policies for implementation (Chapters 11 and 12). Table 6.1 
is provided as a guide to the structure, power and role of 
the many agencies currently in existence. 
6.2 Fragmented planning: who does what. when and where? 
Eighteen separate entities are identified as having some 
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TABLE 6.1 
MATRIX OF THE STRUCTURE ANO RESPONSIBILIT'r' OF 
E~ISTING DOUNTOUN AGENCIES 
: ------------STRUCTURE-------------: :------------POUE~S------------: :------------------------- --ROLE------------- - - - ------------: 
:zotHNG/ 
AGEtK'r' PLIBLI C PR II/ATE MEMBERSHIP LOAN GRANT BOND DESIGN TECHNICAL/ PROMOTIONAL/ MRI tHENfmC E/ ti ANA GE MEN T 
TITLE BOCl'r' NON- PROFIT ORGANIZATION MFll< C NG GIVING FUND~; REVIEU EOU CFITI otff!L MARt~ETI NG LOBE•'r'ING Uf'KE Ef· FLINCTI Ot4 
BUSINESS OUNERS ANO 
MANAGERS ASSOCIATION >< >< >< 
CAPITAL CENTER conn. :-: )': x >< >< 
CI T'r' COUtKI l CMTTEE. 
ON URBAN REOEVELOPT, H :-: >< 
RENEUAL AND PLANNING 
CIT'r' PLAN COMMISSION :-: >< 
DEPT. OF PLANNING 
fHm DEVELOPMENT :-: >< x :-: i-: x x >< 
DOUNTOUN PROVIDENCE 
IMPROVEMENT ASSOt. x x >< >: :-: >< 
G~ERTE~ PROVIOENtE 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE x >< x x l-: >< 
GREATER PROVIDENCE 
CflNllEtHI ON ANO x >< x >< x x 
VI SI TORS BUF:ERU 
IN TOUN x x x >: :-: 
PF:OMENADE CENTER x x x >: x 
PF:OV. HISTORIC 
DISTRICT COMMISSION :-: 7! >< 
PF:OV. INDUSTRIAL 
DEVELOPMENT CORP. x >< ;.: x >< 
P~:ov. FOUNDATION >< x >< >: 
PROVIDENCE LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT CORP. >< >< >: >< x 
Pf:011I DENCE OFF -
STREET PARK I t4G !-( :-: i-: :-: >< 
PF:OVI DE W~E 
P~ESERVArION SOCIETY x >< >< >< x x r: :-: 
Pf:OllI DENCE 
RfDEVEl.OPMENT AGENC'r' :-: >< :-: >: >< >< 
UflSHI NC TON STREET 
Bl 15 ( NE '.:· S AS~00CI fH I ON x :-< >: 
impact upon planning and management in downtown Providence. 
While only a few of them will have prima facie involvement in 
the implementation of the Strategy. and even fewer in its 
adoption. the ramifications of downtown development will 
affect - either directly or indirectly - the operations of 
them all. The matrix of agency structure and operation in 
Table 6.1 summarizes the descriptions below. (As is the 
case in the matrix. agencies are listed in alphabetical 
order and not in respect to their importance to the 
downtown community.) 
Business Owners and Managers Association 
This is a local branch of a national organization. 
consisting largely of property management companies and 
building owners. including banks and speculative property 
interests. It holds monthly luncheon meetings with a 
comprehensive speaking program. Guest speakers give 
lectures and hold discussions aimed at updating the business 
community with technical information. especially in respect 
to building-related problems. B.O.M.A. also includes major 
supply concerns (utilities. elevator companies and service 
contractors). An annual membership fee helps B.O.M.A. to 
lobby for major downtown projecis iuch as the Hurricane 
Barrier. 
Capital Center Commission 
Formed in the early 1980s by state enabling legislation 
and City institution. the Capital Center Commission is a 
highly specialized supra-zoning body charged with overseeing 
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the application of strict design review regulations within 
the Capital Center Project Area. Its management function is 
supplemented by its role as a comprehensive information and 
technical resource. The C.C.C. has an annual budget of some 
$100.000 per year - apportioned equally by City and state -
with a Board approved by the Mayor of Providence. the 
Governor and the Providence Foundation. 
City Council Committee on Urban Redevelopment. 
Renewal and Planning 
This is the major policy crunching sub-committee of the 
City Council which digests and prepares urban issues to be 
put before Council. Taking its lead from the executive 
planning professionals. the five members of the municipal 
legislature who sit on this committee represent the questions 
and concerns of Providence's constituents in respect to urban 
development. 
City Plan Commission 
Final legislative approval of zoning is granted by this 
body. which holds open public meetings and grants variances 
and special exceptions. Technical support is furnished by 
the Department of Planning and Development. which works with 
the Commission to generate relevant zoning ordinances and 
updates to the city's master and neighborhood plans. as well 
as to the Capital Improvements Budget. 
Department of Planning and Development 
This large city agency is the official executive 
planning body of Providence. but it encompasses a wide range 
101 
of planning and planning-related research and line functions. 
The Department is a composite of numerous. previously 
separate. government agencies which were combined under the 
Paolino Administration for the sake of efficiency. The 
Department operates under the following broad sections: 
Economic Development. Neighborhood Services. Management and 
Construction. Policy and Legal Affairs. Planning. and Fiscal 
Affairs. Its structure makes the Department uniquely 
adaptable to planning at both the metapolicy and neighborhood 
level. 
- Downtown Providence Improvement Association 
This private. non-profit agency is paid. in part. by the 
City to maintain and upkeep the streetscapes of downtown 
Providence and. in particular. Westminster Mall. In recent 
years. the D.P.I.A. has become expert in the technologies of 
garbage disposal and street maintenance. as well as in 
formulating employment policies for Providence's youth and 
minority populations. 
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce 
The Chamber was originally established in the late 19th. 
century to serve the interests of the city's merchants. Its 
membership has expanded to include much of northern Rhode 
Island's metropolitan region. many subscribers holding 
membership of a local chamber as well as the Providence 
Chamber. The G.P.C.C. is increasingly involving itself in 
more socially oriented programs - Jobs for Youth and child 
care. for example - and is able to receive federal monies and 
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make loans and grants with its 501-C.3 tax status. Its 
lobbying power is directed mainly toward state economic 
issues; it created the Providence Foundation to focus on 
specifically downtown concerns. 
Greater Providence Convention and Visitors Bureau 
The Bureau has two arms: an Authority and a line or 
service function. The Authority is an entity created through 
state enabling legislation, whose funds derive from a 2 
percent room tax on the three downtown hotels (the Biltmore, 
Holiday Inn and Marriot). Its Board includes the general 
managers of all three hotels. The Authority is obligated to 
pass on its budget to the service function of the Bureau 
which has an Executive Committee and a membership 
organization (consisting of downtown restauranteurs, bar 
owners and travel agents). The Bureau assembles convention 
packages (in conjunction with the hotels) and runs an 
information/promotion service for visitors to the city. 
- In Town 
A branch of the Chamber of Commerce, this organization 
was founded in 1976. Its membership consists largely of the 
retail sector of the Chamber. The agency is limited (at 
least, in its current guise) to running a promotional 
calendar, while its influence is constrained due to the 
decline in the representation of retail uses in recent years. 
Members are overwhelmingly individual store owners from whom 
money is raised annually, essentially for seasonal 
advertising campaigns. In Town is typical of central city 
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'advertising cooperatives'. 
- Promenade Center 
This is a revitalization project on a scale rarely seen 
in Providence. It is a private ef~ort by a consortium of 
developers and commercial interests to develop the old 
Foundry Building on the fringe of downtwon. Still in its 
planning phase, the construction of a hotel, a conference 
center, shops and residential units - in one integrated 
complex - will greatly contribute to the renaissance of 
central Providence. 
Providence Historic District Commission 
P.H.D.C. is a supra-zoning organization established to 
enforce overlay zoning districts on College Hill and 
Broadway. Its members are mayoral appointees, endorsed by 
the City Council. The Commission would be of considerable 
importance to downtown were the City to use historic zones as 
a means of regulatory land use control in parts of the 
Downtown Planning District. 
Providence Industrial Development Corporation 
Established in 1980, the P.I.D.C. is essentially a 
financing entity. Its Board is appointed by the Chamber and 
the City and therefore combines the development interests of 
both private and public sectors. Funding appropriation 
derives from the City, as well as E.B.A. and S.B.A. monies. 
The agency constructs financing packages for local firms, its 
focus being primarily upon industrial uses. P.I.D.C. uses 
self-perpetuating revolving funds and has 503 status. 
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- Providence Foundation 
Established in 1974, the Foundation has charitable 
status and is a 501-C.3 agency. It raises its operating 
budget by soliciting contributions from the top fifty 
downtown corporations, while its tax status enables it to 
obtain supplementary funds from government agencies. The 
Foundation does not own land, nor does it make loans. 
Rather, its role is one of catalyst for downtown project 
initiation. The agency conducts feasibility studies and 
lobbies government agencies to this end. 
Providence Local Development Corporation 
The P.L.D.C. has ten Board Members appointed by the 
Mayor who serve terms lasting two years. Block Grant funds 
are used for feasibility studies, revolving loan funding, a 
C.D.B.G. float, a 503 participatory scheme (in association 
with the Small Business Association), and in the initiation 
of major development projects. Its loan default rate is much 
lower than that of the private banks, running at 
approximately 4 percent. Total available assets run at 
$2,800,000, a budget primarily applied to the elimination of 
blighted commercial properties. 
Providence Off-Street Public Parking 
This is a state enabled, City instituted agency charged 
with the specific task of developing, revitalizing and 
managing the city's parking garages. 
bond monies to fund its activities. 
P.O.S.P.P. uses revenue 
Its chairperson is 
Thomas Moses, Deputy Director of D.P.D. 
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Providence Preservation Society 
This agency's focus is the preservation of buildings of 
architectural and historic significance. It has established 
a separate non-profit financing branch which offers loans. 
from a revolving loan program. for rehabilitating buildings. 
The P.P.S. is a private. non-profit membership organization 
with no public powers. However. its expertise and 
influential membership make it an effective lobbying 
mechanism. 
Providence Redevelopment Agency 
The P.R.A. is the city's official redevelopment agency. 
created by state enabling legislation in the late 1940s. It 
has full public powers and has played a substantial role in 
the processes of urban renewal and urban revitalization in 
Providence. All land which the Agency condemns and acquires 
must be disposed of. according to statute. within five years. 
Washington Street Business Association 
This private membership organization looks to the 
interests of the restaurant and retail uses on Washington 
Street. It is an information-sharing and lobbying 
group designed to stabilize the use composition and 
streetscape of this marginal thoroughfare. 
6.3 With all these agencies. why create another? 
Eighteen agencies. groups and committees might seem 
adequate to manage a city center the size of downtown 
Providence. Yet the principal recommendation of the 
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consultants in their Development Strategy is the creation of 
a new management entity. Clearly, in their assessment of the 
manner in which planning and management are currently 
executed, they found insufficient resources. Without 
specifying the reasons in their report, the consultants 
undoubtedly reached the same conclusions as the Director of 
Planning and Development with regard to the lack of 
coordination in the development of downtown. Too many of the 
agencies are 'dormant'. They simply provide a technical and 
informational resource, lobby for their own interests, or 
promote and market their own goods and services. A scan of 
Table 6.1 confirms the self-serving nature of many of the 
agencies. 
It is evident, in concluding this chapter and Section I 
of the thesis, that further steps are required in the search 
for a fresh planning paradigm for downtown Providence. 
Having described the existing social and economic 
environments, reviewed the substantive elements of the 
Development Strategy, responded to some of its strengths and 
weaknesses, and analysed the existing planning milieu, the 
focus is now switched to the processes of generating a 
practical response, on the part of the City, to the Carr-
Lynch-Levine report. 
*** 
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SECTION II 
POLICY AND PROCESS ISSUES: 
DEVELOPING PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT FOR 
DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND 
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CHAPTER 7 
ON RECEIVING THE CARR-LYNCH-LEVINE STRATEGY: 
THE CITY'S RESPONSE 
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"It is a matter of common observation that in 
Western democracies public administrations and 
policy analysts in general do largely limit their 
analyses to incremental or marginal differences 
in policies that are chosen to differ only 
incrementally. They do not do so. however. solely 
because they desperately need some way to simplify 
their problems; they also do so in order to be 
relevant. Democracies change their policies almost 
entirely through incremental adjustments. 
does not move in leaps and bounds." 
Policy 
Charles E. Lindblom. 1964 
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7.1 The political context 
In the City of Providence, policy most certainly does 
not move in "leaps and bounds". A history of fragmented 
interest groups with poor lines of communication has given 
rise to a mood of omniscient suspicion targeted directly at 
the Administration. Despite Paolina's efforts to foster at 
least the appearance of 'open government', the initial 
reaction of many key non-governmental actors in the downtown 
scene to new initiatives is that of doubt. At the very best, 
a 'wait and see' stance is elected in the face of new ideas 
emanating from City Hall. 
Even before the arrival of the completed Q£~E!£~E 
f~£Yi~~E£~ Q~y~1£E~~E! ~!~~!~~Y· several criticisms were 
leveled at the Administration. Based upon a number of 
interviews conducted as background for this chapter, these 
criticisms can be summarized as follows: 
1. The Strategy was seen in some quarters as an attempt by 
the Mayor to validate - by using supposedly objective 
consultants - new public attention in the historic 
city core. The Paolino family owns sizable property 
holdings in this area of downtown. 
2. This was the first time in over twenty years that an 
Administration had commenced upon a new planning 
initiative in downtown Providence without consulting 
the private sector in respect to problem definition 
and goal setting. 
3. The study process did not involve key downtown actors 
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from numerous. existing agencies whose involvement 1n 
the implementation of the Strategy and. in particular. 
the establishment of the Providence Company was deemed 
essential by the consultants in their report. 
4. Input from the private sector was limited to information 
sought during interviews by Melvin Levine in the 
execution of his market analysis. Fact rather than 
opinion was the basis of this exercise. Criticism was 
therefore retrospective and reactive rather than used 
as an input device. 
5. The consultants were hired without comment from the 
various downtown agencies, public and private. and their 
brief from the Mayor was not made public. In short, the 
downtown community did not know what this new initiative 
would involve, either during the plan generation stage 
or in the long-term. 
6. The consultation allowed for in the two presentations 
given by Steven Carr and Melvin Levine were not 
sufficient as a forum for open debate. Copies of the 
Development Strategy were not available to individuals 
who attended and they were not prepared to respond to 
the brief overview given. 
7. When the Strategy was presented at a meeting of the 
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce, Melvin Levine 
gave vague responses to the questions posed about 
the financing of the proposals and ignored suggestions 
that Tax Increment Financing was inappropriate in the 
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city. T.I.F. was the cornerstone of the implementation 
package he proposed in the document. 
8. No representatives from the existing downtown 
residential community were invited to the presentations 
of the Strategy. 
7.2 Rumblings of discontentment 
Given the negative feelings noted above. the City was 
forced to consider the opinions of a wider audience. The 
presentations referred to in the above list took place amid a 
mixed press coverage. A series of articles in the Providence 
Journal by Dr. Chester Smolski. a professor of Urban Affairs 
at Rhode Island College. throughout the spring and early 
summer. were at the same time encouraging and skeptical. 
Acknowledged as a key public commentator on urban and 
planning affairs. Smolski feared that while the "time was 
ripe" for a fresh approach to downtown development. the 
private sector would need to be directly involved in policy 
making. Clearly. the City had failed to facilitate this 
throughout the planning process. Chapter 8 deals with the 
way the review process sought to overcome some of the 
inadequacies which emerged as a result of the closed process 
of plan development. 
One more negative external factor which contributed 
toward the "summer of review" was a letter in the Providence 
Journal on June 5. 1986. The letter. by Ilse Politzer. a 
critic of the Paolino Administration. criticized the cost of 
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the Strategy ($75,000) and denounced the Mayor's comment that 
"the plan has got some imagination to it". Politzer noted, 
that this "latter quality eludes me completely." As for the 
consultants' recommendations for increased office space and 
more parking garages, Politzer wrote, "There is no question 
that the various notables to whom the Mayor is going to 
submit plan and vehicle for review will approve of both. 
After all, they also approved of Westminster Mall, benches, 
planters, police booth, canopies and the Muzak of its 
beginnings." 
By the time this piece appeared, the private sector was 
beginning to ruminate about whether the entire downtown plan 
was no more than a costly exercise in "planning in a vacuum". 
But the Department of Planning and Development was 
orchestrating its attempt to sell the Strategy: the Director 
himself took personal charge of the review process; members 
were appointed to a new Downtown Development Task Force; and 
a summer intern was appointed to conduct research and execute 
an opinion-seeking questionnaire on its behalf. The 
effectiveness of these measures are analyzed in the next 
chapter. 
As the Mayor and his prof es s i o·n a 1 p 1 an n in g s t a ff b e g an 
to establish a considered response to the Strategy in terms 
of how best to apply it, a letter was received from Executive 
Director of the Providence Preservation Society, Wendy 
Nicholas. As Table 6.1 shows, the PPS has no public powers, 
but it is a fierce lobbying organization and a firm exponent 
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of strict design review in the city. Nicholas expressed 
concern about modifying traditional cobble stone streets on 
the proposed upgraded downtown ring road and requested closer 
attention to design review. not only in terms of standards. 
but in respect to "other design review entities. to determine 
what makes them work well. or not." 
Perhaps the key reservation noted by Nicholas was as 
follows. "The Providence Company requires substantial 
thought. We are concerned about the overlap in 
organizational jurisdiction. What's to be the role vis a vis 
the Providence Foundation? How to deal with the highly 
probable competition in marketing efforts between the 
Providence Company and the Capital Center Commission? How 
does the Downtown Providence Improvement Association fit in? 
To whom will the Board be accountable?" All these were direct 
and pertinent questions. raised by Nicholas even after she 
had read the report. It was apparent to the senior staff at 
the Department of Planning and Development that the private 
sector. the citizen groups and the non-profits would demand 
answers to these and other questions very soon. If answers 
were not provided. the Development Strategy would never be 
more than another shelved document. 
7.3 "In-house" review of the Strategy 
In his second 'State of the City Address'. Mayor Paolino 
had instructed the Department of Planning and Development to 
report to him by the spring of 1986 with concrete policies 
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for downtown development. But the Carr-Lynch-Levine Strategy 
was not presented in satisfactory form until late April (the 
initial draft arrived in March) and the senior staff's 
attention to it came too close to the summer's local election 
campaign for anything 'concrete' to be decided upon. 
Instead. a review process was started. This served the dual 
purpose of addressing complaints from the private sector that 
downtown planning was being conducted behind closed doors. 
and postponing downtown initiatives (always unpopular in the 
neighborhoods) until after the November elections. The 
Administration was fairly comfortable with Paolino's 
standing, but former mayor, Vincent A. Cianci, had not denied 
he would run again. He was perceived as posing a potential 
threat to the incumbent, so stability - at least in the 
public forum - was the order of the day. 
Arthur Markos, Department Director. sincerely believed 
that the plan offered genuine opportunities for coordinated 
downtown planning and attempted to make the process more 
accessible. But before allowing external comment and before 
the Strategy was released for public review, an in-house 
critique was conducted. 
The general air was of disappointment. $75,000 had been 
expended on consultants who came highly recommended. Yet. 
somehow their report was so generalized, so inoffensive. so 
bland, that it failed to ignite the imagination. Many of the 
recommendations were seen as generic planning solutions. 
unoriginal and boring. While the findings of the Levine 
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market analysis confirmed what property managers and 
developers had been saying for two years, there seemed to be 
little validation for adopting all the recommendations 
wholesale. This student, hired as a summer research intern, 
criticized the Strategy in several informal meetings with the 
Department Director, Arthur Markos, and the City Planner, 
Kathy Field, in a manner approximating to the statements made 
in Chapter 5 of this thesis. There was little hope of 
selling the report, as submitted, to the Administration and 
the business community. 
While a personal response to the Strategy is presented 
in Chapter 5, the views of the Department were less severe in 
their negativity. Many of Steve Carr's design proposals were 
seen as useful suggestions for implementation. Indeed, 
several key factors were viewed by senior staff as deserving 
of serious consideration. But almost as many questions arose 
from the report as were answered by it. The key issues, as 
identified by the Department, might be summarized as follows: 
1. Office growth rates - What should be the official public 
sector role with regard to encouraging and influencing 
off ice sector growth, the Foundry development and the 
Capital Center Project Area over and above circulation 
improvements? Will Carr-Lynch-Levine's absorption 
rates hold over the lengthy prescribed plan period? 
2. Office development - Is there a need to change the 
City's stance from regulatory body to entrepreneurial 
body, must it facilitate rather than constrain? How 
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can the outdated property tax structure be changed to 
induce absorption of vacant buildings? Would an 
immediate off ice marketing strategy be a year 
premature? Is the City's policy of placing historic 
preservation over development incentives a valid one? 
3. Retail development - Why are people not shopping in 
central Providence? Where are they shopping? How does 
the City ensure security for shoppers? Is marketing 
the key? If management is the solution. what is the 
best form of management vehicle for central Providence? 
4. Attractions strategy - How can the City afford to 
maintain five attractions locations as proposed by 
the consultants? What private sector funds are 
available? Is there sufficient current and potential 
public interest to support them? What are the evening 
and late-night security issues? Which neighborhood 
associations might be able to help in their management? 
Would it be better to have a city-wide attractions and 
entertainments strategy. including Roger Williams Park? 
5. Design review - The totality and self-contained nature 
of Capital Center demanded site-specific design review: 
does the historic core demand the same? What are the 
specifics of the process. regulations and enforcement? 
Should design review include facades as well as set-
backs. size. bulk. height etc.? How can the Providence 
Preservation Society. with its acknowledged expertise. 
serve downtown design review? What is the public 
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interest in design review - who s h ould be empowered 
to represent the public's taste? Is design review 
really needed, given that nine out of ten developers 
comply with City recommendations about frontages? 
What American cities offer good examples of 
downtown design review? Should design review be 
part of or separate from the new Providence Company? 
6. Downtown residential neighborhood - Can the City 
encourage the use of upper floors, as per the 
consultants' recommendations, for residential use? 
Would a consortium of existing property owners help 
to convert vacant and under-utilized structures to 
downtown housing? Is there structural compatibility 
of existing uses with proposed apartment-type uses? 
What is the target market: artists, students, 
yuppies? What about existing downtown dwellers? 
7. Westminster Mall - Should the City immediately 
remove the unpopular streetscape aspects: benches, 
police booth, planters, lights? What would be the 
City's financial cost in opening the Mall to 
traffic? Would businesses benefit from the opening? 
Would new uses be encourag~d ~r discouraged? What 
would be the immediate and long-term effects on 
businesses of prolonged infrastructure construction? 
What type of design should be used: should the City 
accept the consultants' 'Italianesque' example? 
Would vehicular congestion be a serious issue? 
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Does 
the Mall fail for reasons other than its pedestrian-
only status? Are there other solutions? 
8. Parking and circulation - Can the City afford to 
sacrifice more prime sites to parking garages? Is 
there a security issue? How many spaces will be 
needed given an unpredictable level of demand? Should 
on-street parking be made cheaper? What function does 
the existing ring road serve? If thousands of dollars 
are to be spent upgrading the ring road. what will 
be the overall benefits to downtown vehicular 
circulation? Is the parking/circulation problem in 
downtown Providence real or perceived? 
These eight elements were deemed the most relevant (by 
the in-house Administration reviewers) to future downtown 
planning and management. However. the answers to most of the 
questions were too controversial for them to be transplanted 
into policy recommendations for the Mayor without 
professional and community input. Rather than concentrate on 
the substantive issues of the report and appear to be forcing 
policies upon downtown. the Department of Planning and 
Development had the wisdom to open up the process to external 
review. The eight elements were intended to be settled as 
firm policies before debate began on the necessity for a new 
planning and management entity. 
It might be argued that this was all far too late to be 
generous and democratic. After all. the consultants had 
completed the report and the recommendations had been 
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submitted with little attention paid to those whose 
involvement would be needed to implement them (the private 
sector) or those who would be impacted (the wider downtown 
community). It was because of the potential 'participation' 
controversy. as well as the confusing diversity of 
recommendations in the report. that Arthur Markos instructed 
his research intern. under the supervision of the City 
Planner. to design a survey instrument to be circulated 
throughout the downtown district. With public input. it was 
hoped. the most practical policies would be more easily 
identified. 
Further. the Mayor agreed to establish a Downtown 
Development Task Force (which. for political reasons. would 
report to Markos. not Paolino: Paolino did not want a 
standing committee on downtown issues associated directly 
with him by the media in a run-up to an election) of 
experienced professionals to assist the Department of 
Planning and Development in the process of policy generation. 
The consultants could not possibly have foreseen the level of 
controversy and conflict their report would generate. The 
outcome of the summer review period - the questionnaire 
execution and the Task Force meetings - is analyzed in the 
following chapter. 
*** 
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CHAPTER 8 
PLAN REVIEW AND POLICY GENERATION 
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"If this thing is managed right. it could help 
to save downtown." 
A questionnaire respondent. 1986 
"My opinion is that another agency would be a 
waste of everyone's time." 
A questionnaire respondent. 1986 
"I cannot comment at this time because Carr has 
not been specific enough. I do not really know 
who would be responsible for this new agency. 
What happens if we have another RIHMFC on our 
hands?" 
A questionnaire respondent. 1986 
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8.1 Confusion out of chaos 
Unfortunately for all concerned. the summer which 
followed the City's dilemma in identifying how best to 
proceed with Carr-Lynch-Levine's report did not really 
clarify the future direction of downtown planning and 
management. A survey instrument. designed to tap wider 
public and private sector opinion. only served to reinforce 
impressions that the community was seriously divided on 
issues ranging from substantive matters (like opening up 
Westminster Mall to traffic) to policy matters (like the need 
for a new management agency). It should be clear to the 
reader that the reason why Chapters 9 and 10 are necessary at 
this stage (November. 1986) is that neither the City nor the 
Downtown Development Task Force has ventured concrete 
recommendations for implementing the desirable components of 
The last 
two chapters of this thesis attempt to offer insight into 
what has worked in other American cities (Chapter 9) and. 
ultimately. to propose a theoretical framework for public-
private partnership (Chapter 10). 
This chapter catalogs the 'summer of review'. June to 
October. 1986. in which the findings of a survey instrument 
and the deliberations of the Task Force served to 
institutionalize confusion out of the chaos which 
characterized the arrival of the Strategy in March. 
Confusion is certainly preferable to chaos. yet little has 
emerged in satisfaction of the City's need for a cohesive 
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approach to the downtown community. Meanwhile. development 
of the city's downtown fabric continues and the project-by-
project. micro-policy approach of the Department of Planning 
and Development remains in place. The legacy of laissez-
faire is alive and well in Providence. 
8.2 The execution of the survey instrument 
Under the guidance of the City Planner. Kathleen Field, 
this student was instructed by the Director of the Department 
of Planning and Development to formulate a questionnaire 
aimed at diverse downtown interest groups. Figure 8.1 
represents the survey instrument in its final form. It was 
decided to keep responses entirely attitudinal in character. 
so that a hierarchy of priorities. in terms of which Strategy 
elements were desirable. would emerge. It was hoped that 
clear distinctions would emerge between those elements of the 
plan that would work and those which held little support. 
In order to refine the data analysis exercise. respondents 
were requested to note whether they were from public sector 
or private sector occupations (Question 14). 
The questionnaire's layout was designed so as not to 
emphasize one element over any other. Each section of the 
Carr-Lynch-Levine report was included for comment. Further. 
a blank form was attached to the questionnaire so that 
detailed criticism and review could be offered by each 
individual. The survey was executed on a mail-back basis 
and, perhaps because of the low response rate which typifies 
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FIGURE 8.1 
PROVIDENCE BUSINESS DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
QUESTIONNAIRE: TO SOLICIT OPINIONS AND COMMENTS (Circle Answers) 
1. What is your overall reaction to the Providence Development Strategy? 
ENTHUSIASTIC POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE DISAPPOINTED 
2. What do you think are the most exciting elements of the Strategy? 
a. The creation of a Downtown neighborhood 
b. The re-opening of Westminster Mall 
c. Increased retail/restaurant/entertainment activities 
d. Increased employment potential · 
e. Increased Class 'A' office space 
f. Improved city image 
g. Increased utilization of Downtown during weekends and evenings 
h. Special events program 
i. Other (Please note other elements) 
3. Do you think that the Providence Company (a quasi-public entity) 
will: 
a. Be a viable vehicle for implementation of the Strategy? 
b. Have powers that are appropriate to its responsibility? 
c. Have a financing scheme adequate to fund the Strategy? 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
4. The Report calls for a Design Review Co1T111ittee which would review and 
approve (according to an established set of procedures and guidelines) 
major development plans. Do you agree that the City should establish 
such a Cormiittee? YES/NO 
5. Do you agree with the concept of Tax Increment Financing as proposed 
in the Strategy for the Providence Business District? YES/NO 
6. Do you also agree with the concept of a Special Assessment District? 
YES/NO 
7. Do you agree that the partial re-opening of Westminster Mall is an 
appropriate solution to the lack of activity during off-peak hours? 
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YES/NO 
FI GURE 8.1 cont . 
8. Do you think that the Housing Strategy, which assumes an income 
threshold of $35,000/year to purchase/rent, will: 
a. Create a viable Downtown neighborhood? 
b. Generate evening and weekend activity? 
YES/NO 
YES/NO 
9. Do you think that the emphasis on physical and street design 
improvements is appropriate for the Strategy's successful 
implementation? YES/NO 
10. What is your opinion of the Business District's parking problem? 
11. 
a. Too expensive b. Insufficient spaces c. Too far from destination 
d. Problem is perceived, not real e. Other 
What 
(Use 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
----------~ 
is your reaction to the following Attractions Strategies?: 
this code: a= Enthusiastic, b =Positive, c =Neutral, 
d = Negative, e = Disappointed) 
Improved streetscapes and festival lighting 
Entertainment Center linking Westminster Ma.,...11.--t-o Washington St. 
Performance facility at Cathedral Square 
Soho-type artistic neighborhood --
Waterfront activities district --
Kennedy Plaza performance facilities 
--
12. Downtown development is preceived as responding to an increasing demand. 
Do you think Providence development could support a linkage scheme 
downtown at this time? YES/NO 
13. For our files, please would you check your occupation classification: 
Public Official Developer Banking/Finance 
Educator Private Professional Service --
Downtown Business Other (please descri~ 
------
14. Thank you for filling out this questionnaire. We would appreciate 
any additional conments you might have on the various aspects of the 
Providence Development Strategy, as well as other elements which you 
believe to be vital to successful downtown development. If you choose 
to sign below, it will offer us an opportunity to get back to you for 
further discussion. Please use the attached Conment Sheet. 
15. This questionnaire will be used by the· Department of Planning and 
Development as it makes reconrnendations to the Mayor. Please 
return it within one week to: Mark Motte, c/o Department of Planning 
and Development, Third Floor, 55 Eddy Street, Providence, RI 02903. 
SIGNATURE (Optional) _______________ _ 
ADDRESS/PHONE # 
---------------------
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such a method. only eight percent (25 responses) of the 300 
forms distributed were returned to the Department. 
Naturally. the questionnaire could only be sent to those 
individuals who had been given access to the Development 
Strategy. This limited the survey sample to people who had 
attended the two presentations of the Strategy at City Hall 
by the consultants and those who had been sent copies of the 
Strategy upon request. The former group were all invited 
guests (the presentations. while termed 'public meetings'. 
were not advertised). while the second group were almost 
exclusively from the private sector (mostly members of the 
Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce). The consultation of 
the downtown community was therefore extremely limited in 
scope and. as is described below. no members of the 
residential community were invited to comment. 
Representation from the small businesses. which dominate 
downtown land use. was also nominal. 
A major criticism of the questionnaire ventured by one 
member of the Chamber was. "Who can disagree with Mom. the 
Flag and apple pie?". In effect. all the questions were 
posed to elicit favorable responses: for example. who could 
disagree with the substance of the list in Question 27 What 
many people noted was that. while the substantive issues were 
almost all desirable. the means of their implementation was 
not. The methods by which creating a downtown neighborhood 
would be achieved would bring far greater comment than merely 
asking whether a downtown neighborhood was desirable. 
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8.3 The findings of the survey instrument 
Figure 8.2 summarizes the responses to the 
questionnaire. For the purposes of this analysis, only 
general patterns in the responses are deemed relevant (once 
the Task Force had been appointed, the views of the community 
were rarely mentioned). Of interest, though, are those 
points which were favored by the sample population, but were 
overlooked by the Task Force in its discussions. 
An overwhelming majority of respondents favored the 
elements listed in Question 2. Only the re-opening of 
Westminster Mall and the special events program were 
considered undesirable. In their comments, respondents from 
both the public and private sectors felt that opening the 
Mall was an irrelevance and not the solution to its under-
utilization. Rather, more imaginative service and goods 
provision was seen as the key. Special events were labeled 
as a sub-issue to downtown revitalization: a simple device, 
but insufficient to have a lasting effect. 
The concept of a new management agency (Question 3) was 
favored approximately two to one, but clearly the 
consultants' model was not the appropriate vehicle: the 
sample was split half-and-half as to whether the agency's 
powers, as proposed, were adequate and as to whether the 
financing scheme was right for Providence. At the time of 
the survey execution (early June), there was considerable 
controversy surrounding the consultants' proposal and many 
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FIGURE 8. 2 
RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Question Response 
Enthusiastic Positive Neutral Negative Disappointed 
1 
3 12 5 4 1 
2 (a) 14 (b) 5 ( c) 21 (d) 16 (e) 19 
( f) 22 (g) 16 (h) 7 (i) 0 
3 (a) YES 16 NO 9 
(b) YES 12 NO 13 
(c) YES 8 NO 7 
4 YES 8 NO 17 
5 YES 9 NO 11 
6 YES 3 NO 13 
7 YES 6 NO 18 
8 (a) YES 13 NO 8 
(b) YES 12 NO 5 
9 YES 16 NO 6 
10 (a) 6 (b) 12 (c) 7 (d) 11 
11 Enthusiastic Positive Neutral Negative Disappointed 
(a) 2 6 9 3 3 
(b) 4 10 6 4 1 
(c) 0 0 12 13 0 
( d) 0 7 16 1 1 
(e) 5 8 8 4 0 
(f) 0 3 15 5 2 
12 YES 3 NO 20 
people were not clear about the issues. This might explain 
the large number of people who did not respond to Question 
3 • c • Many simply did not understand the financing proposals. 
Questions 4 through 7. concerning the fractious issues 
of partial re-opening of the Mall at certain hours. stricter 
institutionalized design review. and the two alternative 
methods of downtown district financing (Tax Increment 
Financing and Special Assessment) were unpopular with an 
overwhelming majority of respondents. One hundred percent of 
realtors. business owners. private professionals. developers 
and bankers/financiers were opposed to the financing scheme 
as proposed in the report. Responses to Question 12 
concerning the linkage scheme (which would permit a 
proportion of monies levied in a downtown district to be 
spent on neighborhood improvements) also met with 
overwhelming opposition. These responses reflect the extreme 
conservatism of the city and illustrate the difficulty of 
initiating innovative planning and management techniques. 
Housing was hardly a key issue among this selective 
sample population. but a majority favored the number-
crunching of Melvin Levine. Clearly, if prime land was to be 
designated for residential use, profitability for developers 
was essential. The $35,000 household income threshold for 
access to the future downtown residential market (Question 8) 
was seen as inevitable rather than desirable. The outcome of 
this point might have been somewhat different had existing 
tenants and owner-occupiers been surveyed. The yuppif ication 
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of downtown Providence has not yet occurred. but if the 
residential policies of the consultants are adopted. 
developers will ensure that it does. 
The excellent physical and street design proposals in 
the report won the support of a majority of respondents 
(Question 9). In fact. few criticisms of Steve Carr's urban 
design drawings have since been made. Many commented that 
the illustrations in the report show the vast potential to be 
unlocked in future downtown development. The drawings are 
particularly popular with the historic preservation lobby. 
Not so the parking recommendations. The preservationists and 
public sector employees unanimously decided that parking was 
a 'perceived' problem in the downtown area. Businessmen, as 
might be expected. felt that parking facilities were too 
distant from their properties and that spaces were too few in 
number. As the summary responses to Question 10 illustrate. 
however. there is considerable confusion as to what the 
problem is (if indeed there is one). As one public official 
noted. "There is always space if you are prepared to pay 
$3.50 and walk a bit ••• It's still much cheaper than New York 
and Boston." 
Elements of the Attractions Strategy were the subject 
of Question 11. Surprisingly. very few respondents had much 
enthusiasm for any of them. Once again, the entertainment 
and 'glamor' aspects of the report were seen as peripheral to 
the central questions of economic development. greater 
diversity in profitable land use, and the manner or means of 
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implementation. The most popular attractions were the Art 
Factory entertainment complex (designed to link Westminster 
Mall with Washington Street) and the Waterfront activities 
district (already much acclaimed in the form of William 
Warner's Providence Waterfront Plan). The other centers were 
regarded as insignificant or undesirable. The people of 
Providence. unlike the outside consultants. have always known 
that the disastrous urban design exercise at Cathedral Square 
will never amount to more than a picturesque desert. 
Few real surprises. Little consensus. Poor community 
representation. No opinions sought about implementation. 
In short. the questionnaire was of little help to the City 
and was later to be ignored by the Task Force. A 
questionnaire is usually a method of identifying public 
opinion and gaining valid community input to policies. 
This questionnaire achieved neither. 
8.4 The appointment of a Task Force 
The Downtown Development Task Force was appointed by 
Mayor Joseph. R. Paolino. Jr. on the advice of his Director 
of Planning and Development. The Mayor wanted strong 
representation from the business community with particular 
emphasis on the Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce. 
Apart from the three senior staff of the Department of 
Planning and Development (Arthur Markos. Thomas Moses and 
Kathleen Field). there were eighteen appointees. Their names 
and positions are furnished in Figure 8.3. The profile of 
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FIGURE 8. 3 
TASK FORCE MEMBERS 
DPD STAfF MEMBERS - ARTHUR MARKOS, DIRECTOR 
OTHER MEMBERS 
AMATO, Richard J. 
President 
THOMAS MOSES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR 
KATHLEEN FIELD, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR 
Kates Properties Management Co., Inc. 
290 Westminster Street 
Providence, RI 02903 
751-9600 
CARNEY·, - a. Jay 
Senior Vice President 
Claremont Development Co. 
175 Federal Street 
Boston, MA 02110 
(617) 722-0900 
DALE, Terry · 
Executive Director 
Greater Providence Convention & Visitors Bureau 
30 Exchange Terrace 
Providence, RI 02903 
274-1636 
DOYLE, Robert 
Senior Vice President 
Old Stone Development Corp. 
l Old Stone Square 
Providence, RI 02903 
278-2045 
FAIRCHILD, James 
Executive Director 
Greate·r Providence Chamber of Commerce 
30 Exchange Terrace 
Providence, RI 02903 
521-5000 
FELDMAN, Melvin 
Adjunct Professor of Urban Studies 
Brown University 
Box 1896, Providence, RI 02912 
863-1000 
FRANCIS, Charles 
President 
Ryan Elliott & Co.· of Rhode Island, Inc. 
187 Westminster Street 
Providence, RI 02903 
331-0350 135 
FIGURE 8.3 cont. 
GILBANE, Robert 
Gilbane Building Company 
7 Jackson Walkway 
Providence, RI 02903 
456-5890 
HALL, Charlene 
Executive Director 
Capital Center Project 
30 Exchange Terrace 
Providence, RI 02903 
274-8200 
HENDERSON, John 
Adler, Pollock and Sheehan 
2300 Hospital Trust Tower 
Providence, RI 02903 
274-7200 
KUMEKAWA, Glenn . · 
Inter-governmental Policy Analysis Program 
The University of Rhode Island 
Kingston, RI 02881 
792-1000 
LANGEN, E • Timothy . 
Managing Director 
Trinity Square Repertory Theater 
201 Washington Street 
Providence, RI 02903 
521-1100 
MAURO , Edmund M. , Jr • 
Chairman 
Providence Redevelopm•nt Authority 
International S~pply Company 
215 Niantic Avenue 
Cranston, RI 02907 
944-1600 
NICHOLAS, Wendy 
Executive Director 
Providence Preservation Society 
24 Meeting Street 
Providence, RI 02906 
831-7440 
O'DONNELL, Charles 
1919' Fleet Bank Building 
Providence, RI 02903 
421-1550 
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FIGURE 8.3 cont. 
SARLES, Jay 
Executive Vice President 
Fleet Financial Group 
111 Westminster Street 
Providence, RI 02903 
278-6000 
SHERMAN, Jane B. 
Chairperson, 
City Planning Commission 
254 Irving Avenue 
Providence, RI 02906 
861-3313 
SHUTTE, Thomas 
President 
Rhode Island School of Design 
2 College Street 
Providence, RI 02903 
331-3511 
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participants is interesting because there are no planners 
(other than the in-house personnel). but several bankers and 
developers. The profile is as follows: 
In-house personnel 3 
Educators 3 
Property managers 1 
Developers 3 
Bankers/financiers 3 
Academics 3 
Public officials 2 
Historic preservationists 1 
Lawyers 1 
Entertainment Managers 1 
There is an obvious bias toward the private sector. 
reflecting the stance of the Strategy in respect to economic 
development. but also the Mayor's personal involvement with 
real estate and the acknowledged dominance of the private 
sector in the affairs of downtown (which. after all. is a 
commercial district). However. there were no invitees from 
the neighborhood organizations. citizen groups. minority 
groups. tenant groups. the numerous non-profits or other City 
agencies. The Strategy was couched in terms which were to 
incur minimal costs to the City. with great emphasis placed 
upon capital investment from the private sector. Here. then. 
was a forum. not only in which the idea of a new downtown 
plan could be sold. but in which with the needs of the 
private sector could be identified and a plan tailored 
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accordingly with direct private involvement. The City 
recognized that it did not have the funds to 'go it alone'. 
The Strategy recognized this (indeed. the Carr-Lynch-Levine 
Strategy was unique in the history of Providence planning in 
that it assumed the availability of neither state nor federal 
funds). The Task Force was seen by the City as the only 
means by which a workable plan and a successful 
implementation vehicle could be generated. 
8.5 The deliberations of the Task Force 
According to what was anticipated to be only a summer-
long agenda. the Task Force was scheduled to meet on four 
occasions between July 15 and September 9. 1986 (Figure 8.4). 
The consultants had presented their findings to two invited 
assemblies of various downtown organizations. including the 
Chamber of Commerce. in early June and early July. Feedback 
from the post-presentation questionnaire had been analyzed 
for submission to the Task Force by mid-July. Meetings of 
senior departmental staff would summarize the Task Force's 
findings and provide policy documents for the Mayor by mid-
September. 1986. The process. as defined in Figure 8.4. 
would move from response and feedback mechanisms. via input 
devices. to final policy generation from June 1 to September 
20. With the agenda circulated among appointed members. the 
initial Task Force meeting took place on July 15. 
It would be easy to condemn this process as insular and 
undemocratic. but when compared to the history of urban 
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FIGU RE 8. 4 
REVIEW OF PROVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
ATTENTION: TASK FORCE PARTICIPANTS 
PROPOSED MEETING 
DATE 
PHASE 1. RESPONSE AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS 
6/4 Presentation by Melvin Levine (Consultant) and 
Department of Planning and Development to the 
Providence Foundation 
7/1 Presentation by Carr, Lynch and Melvin Levine 
(Consultants) to City Council, Urban Renewal Committee, 
Historic District Commission, Redevelopment Agency, 
Providence Preservation Society, Planning Commission 
7/15 TASK FORCE - Initial meeting to discuss approach to 
the Strategy, to study its major elements, and to 
review feedback from first presentations and 
questionnaires 
PHASE II. POLICY INPUT 
7/29 TASK FORCE - Second meeting to critique the Strategy, 
to review questionnaire feedback and to establish 
most positive, workable elements 
8/19 Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting -
To initiate policy in respect to adoption of preferred 
Strategy elements 
8/22 TASK FORCE - Third meeting to establish final structure 
of Strategy with particular emphasis on means of 
implementation, the Providence Company, financing, and 
the feasibility of a Downtown Neighborhood as a catalyst 
for increasing market demand 
PHASE III. POLICY GENERATION 
8/29 Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting -
To define policies and proposals to be adopted 
9/4 Completion of First Draft of downtown development 
proposals 
9/9 TASK FORCE - Fourth meeting to obtain final input on 
proposals and policy determination 
9/12 Department of Planning and Development Staff Meeting -
Finalization of proposals for Providence Development 
Strategy 
9/17 Submission of proposals to the Mayor 
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FI GURE 8.4 cont. 
PHASE TIME SCALE 
June July August September 
1 15 30/1 15 31/1 15 31/l 15 30 
+---------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+ 
I *--------------------------* 
II *----------------* 
III *----------* 
PHASE I. RESPONSE AND FEEDBACK MECHANISMS 
This initial period will involve a thorough investigation into the 
validity of the Strategy as a 'downtown plan•, with emphasis upon whether 
the integration of its many elements renders it a workable document. 
The consultants' report will be examined in the light of its strengths 
and weaknesses as perceived by yourself and the other Task Force 
particip~nts. !t is anticipated that a diverse range of views will be 
expressed, but participants are encouraged to identify those issues which 
directly relate to the practicality of the plan - will it fly? If not, 
why not? Which elements have the greatest strengths ••• and deepest flaws? 
Attention will be paid in the first meeting of the Task Force to the key 
components of the Strategy: the establishment of the Providence Company; 
the development of Class 'A' office space; the Attractions Strategy; 
and the development of a 'Downtown Neighborhood'. 
PHASE II. POLICY INPUT 
By this stage, some consensus will have been reached in respect to those 
areas of the Strategy most actively to be emphasized and supported. 
While the first meeting will have established an approach to the 
Strategy, a more detailed critique (including the policy, planning and 
financial implications) is now appropriate. Responses from the 
presentations and the findings of the questionnaire (see example 
enclosed) will provide primary feedback data from both the public and 
private sectors. At this time, the Task Force should help to establish 
the most positive, workable elements of the Strategy in order that the 
Department of Planning and Development might initiate policy concerning 
the adoption of preferred plans. 
PHASE III. POLICY GENERATION 
The end of the sunrner months will mark the coalescing of a wide range of 
opinions into a policy document for the consideration of the Mayor. The 
Task Force will assist the Department of Planning and Development in 
defining the polcies and proposals to be selected for final 
recorrmendation. Again, participants are asked to look to the Providence 
Company (its accountability and financing, in particular), office space, 
attractions, housing and each sub-category of the planning scheme. It is 
hoped that the Director of Planning and Development will be able to make 
his submission to the Mayor by mid-September, 1986. 
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renewal. at least a considered approach was now being taken 
to the direction and potential impacts of fresh initiatives. 
An advisory body of acknowledged experts and powerful 
downtown actors had been assembled and what they recommended 
would be of considerable influence upon the Mayor as he 
attempted to set downtown policy for his new term (Paolino 
was re-elected by a resounding majority in November. 1986). 
The Task Force was presented with individual agendas for 
each of its meetings. None of these was adhered to. It was 
clear that there existed factions within the group. some 
members lobbying strongly in favor of a new City initiative, 
others cynical about the timing of the plan. The first two 
meetings produced nothing in the way of concrete proposals 
and after the third meeting. a period of nearly three months 
passed before the Task Force met again. The fourth meeting 
occurred on December 3. 1986. Over an hour was spent arguing 
over the accuracy of minutes taken by Arthur Markos at the 
third. By the end of the meeting. a broad consensus had been 
built around many of the Strategy's substantive elements (as 
described in Chapter 4). but the issue of the Providence 
Company was raised only briefly. 
Charles Francis of Ryan Elliot Corporation. a 
development firm. informed members that the timing of a new 
agency was quite wrong. given the current downtown 
environment. The Task Force decided to postpone discussions 
regarding the implementation vehicle until 1987. Richard 
Amato, President of Kates Properties, a property management 
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firm headquartered on Westminster Mall, questioned the 
Mayor's interest in the findings of the Task Force. In an 
article in the fEE~iE~E£~ ~E~EE~l on Saturday 30 November, 
1986, Paolino indicated that he was going to re-open 
Westminster Mall and that he did not need an advisory panel 
to tell him whether that was right or not. The very validity 
of the Task Force was brought into question and Arthur 
Markos, the Chairman, was forced to cite examples of the 
"Mayor's sincere interest" in order to re-affirm the panel's 
sense of purpose. 
The points which did win almost unanimous approval in 
the last two Task Force meetings are as follows: 
1. The Task Force will support efforts to bring a 
multi-use, retail development (similar to that 
previously proposed for the Outlet Building) to 
downtown Providence. 
2. Developing and marketing office space is premature. 
3. A private sector initiative along the lines of 
the Carr-Lynch-Levine Attractions Strategy should 
be encouraged. 
4. Design Review is desirable, but the Task Force is not 
qualified to make specific proposals. For the long-
term, coordinated design review is desirable. 
5. A residential neighborhood depends solely on supply 
and demand. Current land values do not permit the 
supply of residences at a cost which would be 
affordable to the type of individual/family who 
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would wish to locate downtown. 
6. The majority sentiment is to leave Westminster Mall 
closed to vehicular traffic at all times. 
7. The ring road will need more than merely improved 
signage to work effectively. Some form of physic.al 
improvements will be necessary. 
8. The current political, economic and inter-agency 
environments do not, at present, indicate that a new 
institutionalized management vehicle would be 
appropriate. 
Because the Task Force has been unable to progress 
beyond the establishment of generalized agreement with 
certain of Carr-Lynch-Levine's recommendations, this thesis 
proceeds with an analysis of the experiences of other 
American cities in downtown development and, finally, with 
proposals for a new public-private partnership for downtown 
Providence. Reservations about its success are expected. 
Given the events of the spring, summer and now the fall of 
1986, there appears to be little hope of exacting a new 
policy from City Hall. If the Administration decides to 
proceed, despite opposition, the Providence Company will 
almost certainly die a swift deathr "The time is ripe", 
wrote Chester Smolski. It is also wrong. 
*** 
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CHAPTER 9 
ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT: 
CASE STUDIES IN DOWNTOWN PARTNERSHIP 
145 
"Anyone who has ridden a bicycle built for two 
knows that while the balance of effort may shift 
back and forth, one partner coasting while the 
other pedals on, long distances can be covered 
only by joint and sustained effort." 
Katherine Lyall, 1982 
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9.1 Introduction 
"Cities have an air of permanence which is both real and 
illusory. Because they are built of concrete and steel, 
their physical forms display the layers of time ••• But cities 
have a social and economic dynamism which continually remakes 
them, sometimes very quickly." (Susan S. Fainstein et al, 
1983). Cities are a complex mosaic of social and economic 
forces which confront the urban planner in a tangled web of 
confusing trends, the outcomes of which are a continual test 
of his skills as researcher. goal-setter and policy 
generator. Because there exist these "illusory" qualities to 
the more visible physical fabric of the city. the planner can 
only succeed in the manner of his intervention by 
understanding the relationships between the marketplace and 
the impact of his actions: existing milieu versus potential 
environment; current power-base versus more equitable 
brokerage; public over private (or more realistically. public 
and private) rather than public versus private. 
The nature of the urban marketplace is inherently 
conflictual. a battle of interest groups. of coalitions. and 
of social groups. each vying for optimal satisfaction and 
individual goal attainment. In complying with his task of 
generating policy does the planner. as he has done 
traditionally. side with those forces best able to preserve 
the status quo. or does he innovate and attempt to find a 
level of convergence between the opposing camps of diverse 
interests. private and public? Intervention is the only 
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means of effecting change. Intervention is therefore 
controversial. It demands of some the surrendering of 
power and. of others. the humility to wield new power 
equitably. Guarantees of equity are never cast in stone. so 
in re-defining the means and extent of intervention. the 
planner must find a vehicle whose constitution sustains the 
intent of goals over a prolonged period. 
This chapter catalogues the attempts of planners and 
their political mentors to institutionalize positive working 
relationships between historically fractious elements in 
downtown communities. In seeking a broader definition of 
'public interest' and in bringing private and public groups 
into one fold. urban municipalities have strived to achieve a 
level of cooperation never before associated with central 
city polities. With the common goals of bringing economic 
growth and people back to the urban core. downtown planning 
and management entities are attempting to bring life back to 
the heart of the American city. The final chapter in this 
Research Project analyzes the effectiveness of the efforts 
made in the case histories described below. Has there been 
true convergence of interests or has the concept of 'public 
interest' been compromised in the name of advancing the cause 
of free market economics? Have goals been set in order to 
permit the status quo to prevail in an environment which has 
developed to the detriment of its long term good health? 
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9.2 Public-private partnership: an overview 
The problems and opportunities of cities have long been 
matters of keen interest to the federal government. The 
response to them has ranged from almost total laissez-faire 
to intense public subsidization. The position of this thesis 
holds that, despite decades of national government 
intervention, little is actually known, by those who coin 
national urban policy, about decision-making processes within 
cities because most decisions are made by local leaders. 
While cities do exhibit similar traits (for example, white 
flight, suburbanization, inner city decay and ghettoization 
of minorities), the response of local politicians has varied 
dramatically from one urban area to every other. 
The growth and visibility of the federal government 
obscured the expansion of local government. With economic 
booms in the 1950s and 1960s, suburban growth, which had 
been noticeable even in the inter-war years, suddenly 
exploded. New local governments were formed in the suburbs 
to provide roads and schools to support growing populations 
at the urban fringes. As a consequence, the traditional 
central cities were drained of middle class individuals, jobs 
and tax bases and, at the same time, were filled with a 
poorer population of rural migrants who were predominantly 
black. Successive federal administrations responded to the 
resultant problems of poverty, health, education, 
unemployment and public safety in a manner which was 
impressive more for its magnitude than its relevance. 
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Seemingly, not even the scope of federal programs was ever 
entirely adequate to follow through with problem-solving. 
Federal policy, by its very nature, is applied at the 
national level - one rule for all. Yet the interpretation of 
the intent of federal urban policy. the implementation of 
federal programs, and the expenditure of federal funds are 
expedited by local mechanisms. To venture that areal 
disparities in socio-economic conditions have been compounded 
by similar disparities in the wisdom of local urban policies 
would be to overwork an already hackneyed truth. But 
increasingly city administrations are having to look to their 
own resources - both technical and financial - in grappling 
with continued inner city decline. Unable to rely upon 
federal revenue sharing, with the contraction of the CDBG and 
UDAG programs, local administrations are looking to the 
strengths of the private sector for collaborative efforts in 
urban revitalization. 
Much research has been conducted with regard to the 
various aspects of urban society. including its social 
structure, political institutions, economic development, and 
government managem~nt. Many of the studies undertaken in the 
1960s concentrated on the social factors underlying urban 
decline. Much of the work carried out in the 1970s focused 
on economic forces. The 198-0s have brought such terms as 
'efficiency', 'practicality', and 'running the town like a 
business' to the fore. There is a dilemma here in that 
governments in capitalist societies carry out residual 
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functions. Residual. that is. because they are those 
functions which will not produce a profit and are therefore 
ignored by the private sector. But the resounding victory 
of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 dramatized a 
nationwide mood swing in public opinion. Government. it was 
believed. was too expensive. Also in 1978, federal grants to 
state and local governments ceased their historic climb and 
began instead to decline. The election of Ronald Reagan in 
1980 and the near unanimity in Congress in 1981 in favor of 
restraining federal budget growth confirmed the change in 
public mood. 
Getting a return on the dollar is today becoming a 
priority in many areas which have fallen to the public 
domain: education. social services. infrastructure provision. 
and neighborhood development. Grants are being supplanted by 
loans which are repayable to the municipality with interest. 
Per pupil cost is the bottom line in educational 
subsidization. Sewers and mains water supplies are driven 
first through those areas with economically viable uses 
hungry for improved infrastructure. As the new. high 
technology industries become more and more 'footloose'. 
municipalities must continually bow to their requisites (for 
fear of losing them to more attractive towns at the next exit 
on the interstate). With federal government urban policy 
contracting and private industry free to take its jobs where 
it pleases. how does local government reconcile its duty to 
preserve an acceptable level of living for its citizens with 
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the hostile reality of current economic circumstances? 
Persuasion is a key factor. By coaxing the private 
sector to behave in a manner conducive to the wider public 
interest. while convincing business that there are benefits 
to be derived from a stable downtown. a municipality can 
overcome many of the financial constraints to achieving 
growth. Injections of capital come from private rather than 
public sources. There has always been a concern, on the part 
of local governments. that specialized but interdependent 
business activities have not automatically integrated 
themselves into a smoothly functioning system. either within 
urban regions or within the citywide economy. Private goals 
are geared to profit. not public well being. 
It is natural that local government. the people's 
expression of collective action. should today be called upon 
to respond to economic fragmentation as manifested in the 
city core. The same pragmatic tradition that has guided 
urban organization for a hundred years must now respond to a 
federal policy vacuum in the inner city environment. A 
rethinking of the roles and relationships of the public and 
private sectors must come from the public sector. The 
private sector will happily go on making profits for itself 
because profit is its only policy. 
Whether the vehicle for finding common ground between 
diverse urban interests is private. public. profit. non-
profit. self-help. volunteer. or a combination of these. 
cities are realizing the need to take the first step in 
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initiating a new order. They are then taking a step back and 
allowing new organizations to act as catalysts for downtown 
change. 
9.3 The sample of cities 
The research for this chapter was consciously biased 
toward those downtown organizations which appear to have good 
track records. The purpose of this thesis is to make 
recommendations for a new management entity or public-private 
relationship for downtown Providence. While one would hope 
to avoid the pitfalls encountered by less successful 
agencies. those which have achieved measurable success offer 
excellent models upon which a Rhode Island prototype might be 
based. 
The International Downtown Executives Association 
publishes a list of what it calls 'Downtown Improvement 
Organizations' (1981). Its most recent enumeration found 81 
agencies in cities as diverse as El Paso. Texas and Fargo. 
North Dakota. Table 9.1 shows that 88 percent of them dealt 
with planning and development issues. while Table 9.2 
illustrates that a three-way split occurs between those 
agencies which are city adjuncts. those which are non-profits 
and those which are independent 501-C.3 organizations. The 
information published by the International Downtown 
Executives Association served as a guide in identifying those 
case studies most pertinent to formulating a partnership 
for Providence. 
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TABLE 9 .1 
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF ORGANIZATION 
Population Category Planning & Development Pranotion Parking 
Less than 50,000 88 % 12 % 0 % 
50,000-99,999 69 23 8 
100,000-149,999 88 0 12 
150,000-249,999 100 0 0 
250,000-499,999 93 7 0 
500,000-one million 83 17 0 
Over 1 mi 11 ion 100 0 0 
AVERAGE FOR 
ALL CATEGORIES 88 % 10 % 2 % 
Source: International Downtown Executives Association, 1981 
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TAB~( 9J. TAX STATUS OR NIZATION 
Population Category 
Less than 50,000- 100,000- 150,000- 250,000- Over 
50,000 99,999 149,999 249,999 499,999 500,000 
Status 
Non-Profit 13 % 17 % 0 % 27 % 20 % 12 % 
Non-Profit 
Taxable 0 17 0 0 0 6 
Ex en pt 33 8 50 18 27 6 
For Profit 0 0 17 9 0 0 
501 (c) (3) 20 17 0 18 7 24 
501 (c} (4} 7 17 17 18 7 6 
501 (c} (6) 7 8 17 9 40 35 
City Agency 13 17 0 0 0 6 
Taxing 
Authority 7 0 0 0 0 6 
AVERAGE FOR ALL CATEGORIES: Non-Profit 16 % 
Non-Profit Taxable 4 
Ex en pt 21 
For Profit 7 
501 ( c) ( 3) 16 
501 (c) (4) 11 
501 (c) (6) 21 
City Agency 8 
Taxing Authority 3 
Source: International Downtown Executives Association, 1981 
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The four cities selected are Baltimore, Maryland, 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Atlanta, Georgia, and Portland, 
Oregon. Unique in their geographic locations, their 
population sizes, their industrial and demographic histories, 
and the form taken by their downtown revitalization and 
management efforts, each has been successful in coordinating 
the public and private sectors to promote growth. 
The Baltimore Citizens Planning and Housing Association 
(CPHA), a group of concerned citizens wishing to improve the 
quality of life in downtown neighborhoods (including James 
Rouse), was responsible for stimulating business interest in 
establishing the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) which went 
on to play a key role in downtown revitalization. In 1957, 
the GBC and its offshoot, the Committee for Downtown, jointly 
raised $150,000 and contracted a professional planning group 
for the development of a master plan for downtown renewal. 
The result was the much-vaunted Charles Center Project. 
Pittsburgh's 'Renaissance I' period owes its origins and 
support to the Allegheny Conference on Community Development 
(ACCD). The ACCD provided the agenda, planning and capacity 
that evolved into the projects of Renaissance I and, more 
recently, the continuation of the scheme in the form of 
Renaissance II. 
The third case study describes how an active Chamber of 
Commerce provided powerful leadership as reflected, for 
example, in the enormously successful Forward Atlanta 
program, an advertising campaign to attract business to 
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Atlanta. In the 1970s. initiative shifted to Central Atlanta 
Progress (CAP). a group composed of the city's top business 
executives. which has been instrumental in sustaining growth 
in that city. 
Portland is perhaps the most unique of the case studies 
in the unusually active role played by neighborhood 
organizations. It was the lack of an organized downtown 
business group that spawned the neighborhoods into action and 
the development of the 1972 downtown plan. The revisions of 
the plan up to this time are noteworthy for the high degree 
of public participation permitted. 
In selecting the four communities. it is hoped that a 
wide range of elements will emerge as contributing to the 
success of a prototypical management agency. Several key 
factors were looked for in estimating the likelihood of the 
case studies to contribute to planning practices in other 
cities. These might be summarized as common elements of 
local initiative (it should be reiterated that these agencies 
come from local and not federal origins): a positive civic 
culture; a realistic and commonly accepted vision of the 
community; effective pre-existing building-block agencies; 
a network among key groups and actors which promotes 
communication of ideas; the nurturing of entrepreneurs; and 
continuity of policy from the inception of a strategy and its 
implementation vehicle up to the point when its role is 
clearly defined and operational. 
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9.4 Public-private partnership in Baltimore, Maryland 
The history of public-private partnerships in Baltimore 
goes back more than thirty years and spans a large number of 
projects, ranging from economic development to housing 
rehabilitation. The success of these efforts can be traced 
back to the work of two organizations, the Citizens' Planning 
and Housing Association and the Greater Baltimore Committee. 
After spending decades in the shadow of the nation's 
capital, Baltimore is beginning to emerge as a vibrant city 
in its own right. National publicity surrounding the Inner 
Harbor renovation and Harborplace has given the city a clear 
identity and independent status. Baltimore is perceived by 
its planners as a city of character: a success story worth 
telling in other cities. 
In Baltimore most civic and private entrepreneurial 
leaders can trace their expertise back to membership in a 
single non-profit organization. the Citizens' Planning and 
Housing Association (CPHA). While its initial foundation 
came in 1941 (as a response to city health issues), its 
potential was only fully realized during the social turmoil 
of the 1960s when inner cities were rioting against social 
injustice. From its inception, the body viewed itself as a 
group of concerned citizens intent upon improving the quality 
of residential neighborhoods through the use of volunteer 
action. CPHA proceeded to set up more than 150 voluntary 
neighborhood improvement associations throughout the city. 
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From humble clean-up and fix-up efforts. these associations 
grew into well-coordinated advocacy groups. 
The mid-1950s saw outcries from the wider city 
population about alleged corruption among civic officials. 
As a response. the City administration agreed to greater 
community participation in the operations of the Housing 
Authority and the Redevelopment Agency; the two bodies were 
merged into the Baltimore Urban Redevelopment and Housing 
Agency (BURHA). a largely volunteer group of professionals 
and advocates founded in 1957. The consolidation of all the 
city's redevelopment and physical development resources into 
one agency was an unprecedented step in American cities. But 
the administration went further - the Department of Public 
Works was later added to BURHA to form the present-day 
Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD). HCD 
is an extremely powerful and effective agency which fostered 
high standards of technical and professional expertise. Many 
of its early pioneers went on to work as senior officials for 
the Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD). This strong background of two decades of public 
spirited citywide planning and development policies has 
created a "stability and unity of purpose within the public 
sector which has undoubtedly been a key factor in the 
successful pursuit. with substantial private sector 
participation. of long-range development goals" (Fosler and 
Berger. 1982). 
CPHA's active support for the creation of a single. 
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integrated development agency. HCD. carried over into 
establishing a political consensus for the need for a 
specialized branch dealing solely with downtown issues. The 
CPHA. together with HCD, set the stage for genuine public-
private partnerships in the 1970s and 1980s. Their vehicle 
was the Greater Baltimore Committee which today looks beyond 
the problems of housing and community affairs to the wider 
issues of central city commercial development and downtown 
revitalization. 
The Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) has been the 
agency responsible for mobilizing business initiative in 
support of downtown renewal efforts. However. bringing its 
goals to fruition took several years. despite the presence on 
its board of such business success-stories as Willard Rouse. 
Robert Levi and Guy Hooday. The GBC's own records (1980) 
state: "Reactions from the business community ranged from 
disinterest to outright opposition. Some expressed the 
concern that the proposed organization would duplicate the 
Association of Commerce (the local Chamber of Commerce) ••• 
The local press also greeted the rumors of the new group with 
skepticism." 
The new organization was intended as an elite group 
consisting of the chief executive officers of the one hundred 
largest corporations in the Baltimore Metropolitan area. No 
specific statement of philosophy was issued. but a pragmatic 
purpose was set down: "GBC will function as a citizen arm of 
the government ••• it could provide the necessary business and 
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financial expertise to help implement city projects; it could 
provide accurate and complete information on their necessity 
through surveys and studies and overcome opposition; finally, 
it would exert whatever possible pressure on the government 
to get approval for necessary improvements •.• Our watchword 
should be 'action now'" (Greater Baltimore Committee, 1980). 
The newly formed GBC quickly settled on a priority 
agenda which unashamedly focused on economic development 
issues: transportation improvements, port development and a 
new Civic Center. Of a lower priority were pollution and 
slum clearance. The Committee adopted the framework of the 
CPHA and worked through a system of subcommittees. James 
Rouse, who went on to design and develop vast inner city 
so-called 'festival marketplaces', was appointed chairperson 
of the Urban Renewal Subcommittee (through which the GBC's 
support of the Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects was 
orchestrated). 
The Greater Baltimore Committee had an immediate impact 
on the development of a privately financed master plan for 
the downtown area. When the plan was adopted by the 
legislature, it realized that in order to demonstrate its 
effectiveness the Committee would have to focus on one or two 
smaller projects which would awaken the interest of the city 
population and gain the confidence of the City if successful. 
Charles Center, for which private capital was quickly raised, 
was an unqualified success in terms of commercial development 
and infrastructure improvement. More importantly, the 
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project gained massive media exposure with full credit for 
the development attributed to the GBC. The Committee went on 
to initiate and develop a number of small scale projects, as 
well as the impressive Inner Harbor scheme, throughout the 
late 1970s. 
As an example of well-coordinated private sector 
involvement in city planning and development, Baltimore 
presents a long history of continuity in the sharing of 
responsibilities between power brokers, be they private or 
public. Clearly, the GBC was intended to be a non-profit 
private enterprise. The beneficiaries of its actions, 
however, have been the city's businesses rather than its 
citizens. The people of Baltimore probably feel that Charles 
Center is more desirable than the decaying wasteland it 
replaced. But within the context of a privately-sponsored, 
privately-executed, downtown plan, the goals for development 
were to render stagnating land uses profitable once more. 
The citizens of Baltimore now have festival marketplaces, 
harborfront vistas, landscaped walkways and numerous 
specialty stores. The changes have been physical and 
economic. Clearly, the GBC has fulfilled the goals it set 
for itself. Almost entirely with private money, the city of 
Baltimore has been given a centerpiece; a worthy 
demonstration of capitalism organizing to preserve the status 
quo, but in a fashion acceptable to those with an eye for 
aesthetics rather than equitable function. 
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9.5 Renaissance in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
During the nineteenth century. the city of Pittsburgh 
evolved from a military post to being one of the n a tion's 
most important industrial centers. As early as 1850, a 
larger share of Pittsburgh's population was involved in 
manufacturing than in any other U.S. city (Stewman and Tarr, 
1982). In contrast, throughout the twentieth century, 
manufacturing growth in the city and the region has declined 
as the region's advantages - cheap mineral fuels and access 
to growth markets - weakened. Since the end of World War II, 
the city's overall manufacturing employment has decreased 
markedly from approximately 50 percent of the total workforce 
in 1940 to 25 percent in 1980 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1940, 1980). In the same period, the total population 
declined from over 700,000 to less than 400,000. 
Public-private partnerships are not unique to the 
twentieth century in Pittsburgh. In the nineteenth century, 
the city aided private firms in constructing railroads and 
began helping housing developers by providing sewers, streets 
and water in new subdivisions. But the most vigorous period 
of partnerships (before the institutionalized program known 
as 'Renaissance I') came earlier this century. Three 
citywide voluntary organizations - the Civic Club of 
Allegheny County, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Civic 
Commission - became involved with urban improvement projects. 
Their aim was to improve the inferior social, environmental 
and political conditions that were direct by-products of the 
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city's industrial development. 
Pittsburgh's philanthropic industrial classes set a 
pattern for social intervention policy which acknowledged 
that social. as well as economic. needs had to be addressed 
in order to promote a stable urban community. The voluntary 
associations cooperated with successive city administrations 
in generating a centralized educational administration and in 
revising the electoral system. Institutional changes seemed 
realistic goals. In the more substantive areas of 
transportation. city planning. flood control and housing 
improvements. little substantive change was implemented: the 
forces of localism. vested economic and political interests. 
weak enforcement capabilities. and inertia prevented change 
in spite of corporate and financial leaders' support for it. 
It was. once again. the private sector which drove the 
movement for coordinated urban revitalization in the 1940s 
and 1950s. A number of independent private organizations 
were established to reverse the entrenched pattern of decline 
- The Citizens' Committee on the City Plan (the CCCP later 
evolved into the Municipal Planning Association). the Golden 
Triangle Commission (a branch of the Chamber of Commerce 
geared to halting decline in city ieal estate values). and 
the Allegheny Conference on Community Development (ACCO) were 
the three key private catalysts in this period. The years 
that followed the establishment of these organizations in the 
mid-1940s witnessed the development of diverse revitalization 
projects which together are known as 'Renaissance I'. 
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Redevelopment projects could not begin without the state 
passing enabling legislation. Without consulting the 
Allegheny Conference or the other Pittsburgh private 
organizations. the Pennsylvania State Legislature passed a 
Housing and Redevelopment Act and supporting legislation in 
1945 and 1946 which became known as 'The Pittsburgh Package'. 
Because of problems with initiating the intent of the 
enactments. the ACCD lobbied strongly for further legislation 
which would serve its social purposes. As a result. nine out 
of ten proposed bills were passed. They involved county 
smoke-control legislation. county refuse disposal. expansion 
of county control over subdivisions. creation of a parking 
authority. establishment of a county traffic and transit 
study commission. founding of the Parks and Recreation 
Department. and broadening the Pittsburgh tax base to include 
sources other than real estate. 
At last. the legislative infrastructure for implementing 
meaningful social and economic programs was in place. An 
example of how social and environmental forces cooperated 
with one another came with the founding of the United Smoke 
Council of the Allegheny Conference on Community Development. 
a sub-branch of the ACCD. The Conference helped the City try 
to moderate its impact on low income domestic fuel users by 
keeping an inventory of low-volatile coal and arranging for 
release of metallurgical low-volatile fuel by the steel 
companies if supplies ran low. On its part. the City's 
Bureau of Smoke Prevention followed a policy of education and 
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cooperation in enforcing the law against domestic and 
industrial fuel users rather than insisting on rigid 
(Stewman and adherence. The result was a much cleaner city 
Tarr. 1982). 
In the arena of economic projects. public-private 
partnership was equally impressive. Point Park and Gateway 
Center are examples of cooperation between diverse interest 
groups in the areas of legislation. funding and 
implementation. Point Park. a recreational open space. and 
Gateway Center. a commercial redevelopment project. were 
conceived as complementary components of one plan. In 
recognition of the contributions being made by the ACCD in 
revitalizating downtown. the secretary of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Forest and Waters requested that the 
Conference accept responsibility for implementing the park 
plan. The 36 acre open space was brought into being by two 
integrated actions. First. the design and layout conducted 
by the Steering Committee of ACCD. Second. the passing of 
resolutions permitting clearance of existing uses under the 
Redevelopment Act by the City Council. Together the public 
and private sectors brought into being a green space in the 
middle of a dense commercial zone. The blighted area 
abutting the park then emerged as the successful Gateway 
Center which saw massive re-construction in the 1950s. The 
Bell Telephone Building. a parking garage. a Hilton Hotel. a 
22 story office building. the IBM Building. and the 27 story 
Gateway Towers Apartments now stand where once there was 
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rubble. 
The environmental. high-rise and park projects of 
'Renaissance I' are the physical manifestations of this 
period. But Renaissance involved a much broader range of 
projects - from sewage treatment plants and garbage 
collection improvements to housing and industrial park 
development. Each included a varying mixture of public-
private partnership involvement in goal setting and planning. 
In most programs. the public sector role was primarily a 
facilitating one. but still of immeasurable importance. The 
private sector came to acknowledge the force with which the 
city administration supported its controversial and sweeping 
changes. The chairman of the ACCD noted. "The Conference 
did not have to be elected to anything. The public officials 
who were supporting the Conference's program did have to come 
up for re-election". There was. then. a moderating influence 
on both sides. Renaissance I appears to have been a most 
successful story in the public sector's ability to leverage 
private capital and expertise in promoting central city 
growth. As in the case of all the sample cities, whether or 
not the track record of each partnership meets the needs and 
milieu of the City of Providence in 1986 will be addressed by 
Chapter 10 of this thesis. 
9.6 Progress in Central Atlanta. Georgia 
Partnership in Atlanta has been a fairly recent 
phenomenon. Its selection for this study was based upon the 
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similar regional and national economic climates which today 
face downtown Providence. On October 27. 1981. the citizens 
of Atlanta elected a national figure to be Mayor - Andrew 
Young. former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. While 
his radicalism did not at first appeal to the business 
community. there is increasingly a sense that partnerships 
between commerce and City Hall are taking off. 
The current Atlanta economy was forged by two decades of 
transformation. During the relatively short period since 
1965. an agrarian Southeastern economy has been replaced by a 
new industrial-technological society. This fast paced change 
is forcing Atlanta to come to terms with developing a public 
management apparatus attuned to changing needs. 
During Atlanta's new growth phase - the 1960s and 1970s 
- the city made a quantum jump in economic development. 
advancing from its traditional role as a regional 
distribution. transportation. financial and professional 
services center to that of a large metropolitan area with a 
broad array of national economic responsibilities. Although 
the proportion of manufacturing jobs is relatively low. the 
economy is well diversified and has spawned entirely new 
local industries such as the convention business (at which 
Atlanta excels nationally). This is precisely the 
diversification recommended for Providence by the consulting 
firms of Carr. Lynch Associates and Melvin Levine and 
Associates in their Development Strategy (1986). with 
convention business identified as a key element. 
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'Central Atlanta Progress' (CAP) was formed in 1967 by 
the merger of the Central Atlanta Improvement Association and 
the Uptown Association. CAIA was founded in 1941 to 
represent the interests of the business community. Uptown 
was founded in 1962 by the directorship of the First National 
Bank and Sears-Roebuck to put private sector pressure on the 
City to execute public improvements. Neither had been 
particularly successful prior to their merger into the CAP. 
During the 1960s. Atlanta began its greatest building 
boom. and the famous 'Forward Atlanta' national promotion 
program was launched under the auspices of the Chamber of 
Commerce. Henson and King (1983) describe how Business Week 
labelled Atlanta as "the Cinderella city of the 1960s". The 
CBD was far outgrowing its traditional boundaries and it was 
clear that the core demanded a special plan to address its 
problems. CAP immediately initiated the Central Atlanta 
Study. funded by a grant from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and matching funds contributed by the City and 
Central Atlanta Progress. The City and CAP cooperated 
throughout the planning process and set the tenet for 
integrated public-private partnership for the next two 
decades. Balance was maintained because. while CAP was 
representing Atlanta's most powerful businessmen. it 
concentrated on strictly professional and technical input: 
its executive director was a professional planner. 
The CAP took an even stronger professional role in the 
planning of downtown when a conscious decision was made in 
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1973 to hire Dan Sweat. Jr. to the top staff post. Very 
active politically. Sweat's personal motto was "get things 
done". He brought to CAP a vigor and impatience that remains 
characteristic of the agency to this day (Fosler and Berger. 
1982). Sweat dealt directly with the Mayor and City Council 
members. He was seen as the mouthpiece of the business 
community. Quietly. but with self confidence. Sweat's CAP 
usurped the traditional power base of the Chamber of 
Commerce. The transition was so smooth that no controversy 
arose. Indeed. during the mid-1970s. the working 
relationship between the public and private sectors had never 
been better. 
To summarize. Atlanta represents a case study in how to 
succeed. without creating a new agency. through improvement 
of existing institutional interaction. By improving 
relations between key players in City government and key 
players in a professional business organization. CAP ensured 
balance and continuity in the development of a dynamic 
downtown environment. Personalities emerge as being as 
important as (if not. more important than) the projects and 
plans themselves. 
9.7 Collaboration of diverse groups in Portland. Oregon 
Ben Chieh Lin (1970) characterized Portland as 
"America's Most Livable City". The area's scenic grandeur 
and some of the nation's strictest environmental protection 
laws have earned Portland the description: "One of the 
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largest small towns left" (Barbour. 1982). Barbour describes 
the generosity of public spirit among Portlanders. In a 
survey he conducted. the question was asked. "Do you feel 
that public-private cooperation is necessary for economic 
development to succeed?" To which one respondent answered. 
"Is there any other way to do it?" Most of the public-
private debate has focused on the organizational dimension. 
because the need for cooperation is taken by most people 
as given. 
Public policy in Portland might best be summarized as 
'the politics of participation'. The diversity of the city 
is represented by 68 neighborhoods and some 54 separate 
neighborhood associations. Most of these participate in the 
process of urban planning. either directly or indirectly. 
For example. it is common practice for the City to consult 
with the associations on all matters relating to recreation. 
transportation. and housing. The Office of Neighborhood 
Associations (ONA). established in 1974. shares 
responsibilities with the City Bureau of Planning and the 
Portland Development Commission for intervention and change. 
The three bodies combine to form an efficient vehicle for 
implementing development projects. both public and 
commercial. Consensus-building is the key. 
Even the City's policy documents are grounded in 
recognition of the importance of public-private partnerships. 
The 1980 Portland Downtown Plan (which. incidentally. was 
drawn up by the City and independent associations themselves. 
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and not by outside consultants) views partnership as an 
essential ingredient in expediting goals. Not only the 
public sector. but the private sector realizes the need for 
by-partisan cooperation. In its 'Report on a Vision of 
Portland's Future'. the business agency known as 'The City 
Club'. stated: "Government and business relationships will 
improve with creative and flexible approaches to problem 
solving ..• Business and government will work together to set 
goals to meet environmental and social needs •.• Business 
owners will recognize that a healthy economy includes high-
quality social. cultural. educational. and recreational 
institutions." 
One example of public-private cooperation highlights the 
well-orchestrated integration of traditionally diverse 
groups. The 'Saint Johns Business District Improvement 
Program' set down clear goals at its inception. The 
development company. Lord and Leblanc Inc •• the City. and the 
Office of Neighborhood Associations agreed that certain key 
ingredients must be recognized to ensure successful outcomes: 
1. The importance of cohesive and identifiable 
neighborhood leadership 
2. The value of a comprehensive approach 
3. The need for a sense of place and identity 
4. The importance of capacity building and the 
availability of expert staff. 
These four statements of structure underpinned the economic 
rationale of conducting the Saint Johns revitalization 
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project. Saint Johns was seen, first and foremost, as a 
unique inner city neighborhood, not as a 'project area'. 
From the outset, the business community and the planners 
believed that it was important to combine commercial 
improvement with residential area conservation so that home-
owners would not be in competition with merchants for City 
dollars. An economic analysis showed that the central 
problem facing the business district was its inability to 
capitalize on growth in the area's market demand. With 
expansion and change, local business could capture a greater 
percentage of the growing neighborhood market. The final 
product of the planning process was a comprehensive program 
that set the basis for public expenditures in Saint Johns 
over a five year period. 
In respect to implementation, the planners detailed the 
potential for public-private partnership in every element of 
the plan, thus maximizing capital resources and minimizing 
wasteful duplication of roles. Overcoming this stumbling 
block has been a major set-back in development projects in 
downtown Providence for years. In Portland, cooperative, 
mutually beneficial management underwrites the key component 
of the plan to this day: physical improvements alone will not 
solve the problems facing a central business district. The 
lesson of this booming Oregon city is that in order to create 
a strong commercial central place, it is equally important to 
improve management of business operations and to actively 
promote and provide new opportunities for private investment. 
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As Portland has proved. there is absolutely no reason why 
this goal should not be commensurate with preserving 
neighborhoods and community life. as long as those 
communities are represented in the planning and development 
processes. 
9.8 Organizational frameworks for successful partnerships 
Defining success is something of a normative exercise. 
Yet decisions will be made by politicians whether or not the 
planner has had time to establish recommendations. The four 
case studies illustrate how city administrations can 
facilitate wise long-range planning by involving business 
and. preferably. neighborhood groups in every stage of the 
decision-making process - from goal setting to implementation 
and management. 
Because each city has achieved positive outcomes in its 
quest for balanced cooperation between the public and private 
sectors. components of the four approaches will serve as a 
prototypical model for Providence. Figures 9.1 through 9.4 
are summary system diagrams. developed by this student. which 
serve to describe the institutional arrangements of the four 
case study agencies within their political environments. For 
the reader's convenience. they are appended to the end of 
this chapter as they serve to illuminate some of the 
discussions in Chapter 10. 
Several key lessons are learned from this analysis of 
other cities' experiences. Clearly. the milieu in which 
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planning is conducted is central to the chances of sustained 
success. An atmosphere of cooperation. such as that 
identified in Pittsburgh and Portland. is a reliable 
indicator of probable success. In cities like Atlanta. 
where businesses are aware of the benefits to healthy trade 
when social and environmental issues are dealt with. 
partnership is a natural extension of existing. non-
institutionalized relationships. 
Civic spiritedness on the part of City agencies and 
Chambers of Commerce. such as those in Baltimore. provide a 
firm basis for public-private partnership. When cities are 
able to tap the financial resources of the private sector. by 
involving them in mutually beneficial projects. a broader 
definition of 'public interest' is coined. If state and 
federal policies will no longer pursue interventionist urban 
policies. cities which ignore the possibilities of 
partnerships among existing resource bases within their own 
boundaries. are those which will continue to see decline. 
The task of the final chapter of this thesis is to 
identify the strong and weak points of the different public-
private partnership mechanisms discussed above. In so doing. 
criteria are set for a new cooperative relationship in 
downtown Providence. It would be the intention of this new 
vehicle to identify and implement the desirable elements of 
the consultants' plan and would provide an answer to the 
question. 'After the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development Strategy. 
what next for downtown Providence?' 
* * * 
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FIGURE 9. 4 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP IN PORTLAND 
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CHAPTER 10 
A NEW APPROACH TO PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
IN DOWNTOWN PROVIDENCE. RHODE ISLAND 
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"A downtown management authority is no guarantee 
of success. It will require considerable work 
and constant promotion •.. but to do nothing is a 
sure sign of decline. The city is moving forward 
with much of its work in progress or on paper. but 
now the ball is in the hands of the private sector 
to work concurrently with the city ••• " 
Chester Smolski. 1986 
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10.1 The time is ripe 
It is apparent from the preceding case studies that a 
major rethinking process is under way in the United States 
concerning the appropriate roles of government and private 
institutions in responding to human needs. Fueled in part by 
the reinvigorated conservative movement and public concern 
over the cost and effectiveness of government programs in the 
past. efforts are being made to fashion alternative ways to 
address the problems of downtown communities. 
Chapter 6 identifies a list of some eighteen agencies 
already in existence in downtown Providence. Rhode Island. 
Yet. disappointingly. there is little evidence to be found of 
inter-agency cooperation even at the most rudimentary level 
of information-sharing. The fragmentation of roles in the 
planning and management of the city core might well have been 
politically beneficial to incumbent mayors (no one agency 
ever gaining sufficient jurisdiction or power to challenge 
Administration initiatives or. indeed. the actions of other 
agencies). but the legacy constitutes inefficient chaos. 
Indeed. one of the major goals behind the establishment of 
the Providence Local Development Corporation (PLDC) and the 
Providence Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) in the 
early 1980s. was to guide potential investors through the 
morass of regulatory. advisory and financing bodies then in 
existence. Since that time. neither of these agencies has 
fulfilled the promise of coordinated commercial and 
industrial development in the city. 
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With the arrival of the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development 
Strategy earlier this year, the City at last has a starting 
point; a focus for integrated downtown management. While the 
financing outline and the accountability of the proposed 
Providence Company have run into the expected political 
wrangles over power brokerage, the Department of Planning and 
Development now has an opportunity to institutionalize 
efficient downtown planning. Setting aside the reservations 
expressed throughout this thesis as to the capability of the 
key actors to settle the issue in the prevailing political 
climate, this final chapter assesses the experiences of the 
cities described in the preceding case studies and, finally, 
attempts to propose a prototypical management entity and 
public-private relationship for Providence's core. 
10.2 Identifying strengths in downtown management 
While Baltimore is often held up as the most successful 
example of downtown revitalization partnership, its 
prestigious Charles Center and Inner Harbor Projects were not 
without problems in respect to their implementation. 
The City contracted with Charles Center/Inner Harbor 
Management Corporation to manage the mechanics of the 
development process, the CCIHMC having been created by the 
City as a quasi-public organization to manage land 
acquisition, site preparation, construction and package-
development deals. It will be noted by readers from 
Providence that the problems catalogued below relate to 
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implementation difficulties rather than to the inter-
relationships among agencies. They seem, therefore, less 
acute and more 'downstream' than the problems which might be 
anticipated when institutionalizing partnership in the 
capital of Rhode Island. 
Three broad categories of negative impacts on plan 
implementation in downtown Baltimore are identified: 
opposition to a new network of urban expressways in and 
around the CBD; resistance of smaller businesses to 
displacement from the renewal area; and citizen opposition to 
the siting of Harborplace on one of the last open spaces on 
the waterfront. In each case confrontation brought about 
either defeat or victory for the City. But, again in each 
case, the overall plan and partnership arrangements survived. 
As an example of how the City and the CCIHMC resolved 
conflict, the case of the Harborplace location is described. 
By the time the Harborplace markethouse project was 
announced, the city's residents had become accustomed to the 
'gap' in urban development at this location on the 
waterfront. Because urban inf ill had been so thorough 
elsewhere, Baltimoreans had developed the habit of 
frequenting the remaining open spaces on the north and west 
sides of harbor developments. The most notable of local 
events staged there was the Baltimore City Fair that brought 
millions of people downtown each year. 
When it was announced that part of the new project would 
be located on one of the waterfront's last undeveloped tracts 
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of land. objections were rampant throughout the residential 
community. as well as the small nearby business community of 
Little Italy. The debate was finally settled when the City 
agreed to hold a referendum. The arguments on both sides 
were put forward in the local media and in open meetings. 
Before the ballot. the City agreed to set aside Rash Field 
and three urban park areas as recreational open spaces in 
perpetuity. 
Because of the frankness of all parties. a free flow of 
discussion. and the popularity of the waterfront plans once 
they were widely publicized. the result of the vote was 
overwhelmingly in support of Harborplace. This case study is 
one which demonstrates the benefits of a free-flow of 
information and opinion. from diverse quarters. in building a 
consensus of public and private viewpoints behind a downtown 
plan. It should be noted. once more. that the means of 
implementation were rarely even questioned. Baltimore had a 
fine history of cooperation among its citizens and 
businesses; Harborplace bears witness to the progressive 
nature of the relationship between the two. 
The need for partnership arrangements to be flexible. 
even highly dynamic. is demonstrated by the example of 
Pittsburgh. The previous chapter noted several achievements 
of the so-called Renaissance movement in the city. But 
between the distinct phases of the public-private partnership 
(known as Renaissance I and Renaissance II) there was a 
period of five years now known as 'The Interlude'. 
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The crescendo of the Civil Rights Movement into what 
amounted to a national emergency was felt strongly among the 
ethnic communities of Pittsburgh. The difficult fiscal 
conditions of northeastern and mid-Atlantic cities hit hard 
in this western Pennsylvania metropolitan area at the same 
time. Large scale 'physical fabric' developments. heavily 
subsidized by the federal government. began to wind down. 
Perhaps as a result of these factors. an independent mayor. 
whose motto was "I'm nobody's boy". was elected. All this 
marked the beginning of the unsettling period known as The 
Interlude. 
No-one has ever suggested that development came to a 
halt. nor that public-private partnerships came abruptly to 
an end. Rather. although Renaissance I partnerships were 
gradually dissolving. a major new type of partnership -
appropriate for its time - was being shaped: social and 
organizational cooperatives between the public and private 
sectors. Three specific areas of change emerged: new links 
with the previously ignored black community; the 
reformulation of urban renewal policies into positive housing 
programs; and the improvement of efficiency within the city's 
government. 
Perhaps the axiom that applies to Pittsburgh (and should 
now be applied in Providence) is that winning the battles is 
not half as important as winning the war. In-fighting among 
competing groups never achieves the results of striving for 
long-term. apparently unattainable. goals. The leaders of 
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governments, agencies, and companies come and go. City 
partnerships must therefore be willing to overcome the 
stigmas of traditional inter-group relationships and take 
account of new personalities, work habits, technologies and 
changing patterns of policy among groups. 
It is a tribute to Pittsburgh that, despite the flux of 
national turmoil which gave rise to the local Interlude 
period, three major public-private brick-and-mortar 
developments were successfully executed during this time: a 
rapid transit system, new bridges, and a large convention 
center were all realized during this era of profound social 
and economic change. In attempting to formulate a new agency 
and a new set of inter-agency relationships in downtown 
Providence, this thesis subscribes to the models of both 
Baltimore and Pittsburgh in that each demonstrates the 
preparedness to accept changing circumstances and the ability 
to adapt to changing demands. 
primarily about change. 
Planning. after all, is 
In Atlanta. the most recent example of partnership is to 
be found. It too indicates that an ability to interpret the 
political milieu and respond to changing community needs are 
fundamental to achieving successful public-private 
partnership. In 1973 two quite separate trends gave rise to 
a power shift in the central city: a black mayor with a 
largely black administration came to office; and the 
neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations were emerging as 
a new powerbase. consolidated after successful opposition to 
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highway construction during the preceding three years. It is 
difficult to determine whether a conscious decision was made 
by Central Atlanta Progress to strengthen its capability to 
meet these and other problems. but . the beginning of an 
enlarged. broader based CAP was under way. 
The transition of power away from the traditional 
Chamber of Commerce to Central Atlanta Progress was never 
seen by local businessmen as a threat to the status quo. Few 
could argue with the credibility of CAP's sole criteria for 
membership: a willingness to work for the collective 
interests of downtown. CAP began to pride itself on being a 
reservoir of power and action. Besides. it carried out much 
the same program as had the Chamber of Commerce. but with 
greater efficiency and greater popularity. The key lesson 
for Providence policy-makers is that operations in Atlanta 
are carried out by experts in the problem area at hand. 
regardless of the titles or job descriptions of individuals. 
If downtown Providence agencies could acquire. and later. 
cede power where necessary - according to the needs of 
identified problems - surely the progress would be sufficient 
to justify the emergence of new forces. If an agency like 
the Providence Company were given time to prove its worth (in 
social as well as dollar terms). the benefits of partnership 
would be undeniable and unanimously accepted by doubting 
individuals from both public and private sectors. How can 
officials expect real change if they will not set up a 
mechanism to facilitate it? 
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The final case study. that of Portland, presents a very 
positive view of neighborhood participation in social and 
economic development projects. Few cities can have witnessed 
the flourishing of common interests between so many different 
power bases. As is found in each of the case studies (and as 
is patently not the case in Providence). the political milieu 
of Portland has a long history of cooperation and consensus-
seeking. Each party clearly recognizes the benefits of 
compromise - on all sides - in mediating development disputes 
and achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. 
George Barbour. Jr. (1982). writing on Portland, notes. 
"Most of the public-private debate has focused on the 
organizational dimension, but such cooperation has an 
important human dimension ••• When the institutional 
framework ••• is stripped away. what is left, basically. is 
people cooperating with people." The lesson learned form 
Portland is that ceding power is equally as important as 
acquiring it. Only through moderation can downtown 
development. sensitive to all groups to be impacted by 
policy. be achieved. To this end, certain 'equity 
safeguards' are built into the prototypical model for 
Providence ventured by this chaptei. 
10.3 The Downtown Development Task Force redefined 
Sub-section 10.4 presents the key recommendations of 
this document: the Providence Company and a new set of 
inter-agency relationships among existing downtown 
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organizations. But the means by which this new entity will 
come into being are probably as important as the entity 
itself. Unless there is a solid coalition among vested 
interests from the outset, any attempt by the City to 
institute a fresh approach will last no longer than the 
initial outrage it will engender. Quite simply. it will be 
ignored and, through isolation. be rendered useless. 
The purpose of re-stating this fact before outlining the 
form and structure of the proposed Providence Company is to 
admonish local officials and captains of industry for their 
fragmentary. self-serving actions in recent decades. Because 
of its long history of fractious politics and the exclusivity 
of its agencies. Providence shares none of the benefits which 
enabled Baltimore. Pittsburgh. Atlanta and Portland to make 
their partnerships a reality (see Chapter 9). The timidity 
and over-sensitivity of the Department of Planning and 
Development must cease. This large agency must seize the 
current opportunity. in the wake of the Carr-Lynch-Levine 
Development Strategy. to catalyze a new partnership between 
the public and private sector. One way to commence this 
process would be to arm its Task Force with a more equitable 
representation of downtown interest groups and utilize it as 
a tool to set up the new downtown entity. 
Some damage to the credibility of the Task Force has 
already been done. As noted in Chapter 8, one member feels 
she was brought into the fold to "rubber stamp" a fait 
accomplis. The Chamber of Commerce was far from pleased that 
190 
the consultants were appointed and the Development Strategy 
executed before they were involved. It is hardly surprising 
that the reception of the consultants' proposals for a new 
management organization was luke warm throughout the private 
sector; the businesses to be relied upon to both finance and 
initiate projects were never directly consulted by the City. 
This was a grave error. but not insurmountable if future 
steps are taken with due courtesy to all parties. 
The selection of new members for the Task Force should 
take account of a wider range of both public and private 
interest groups. The Providence Foundation and Chamber of 
Commerce must have a more significant voice. particularly if 
the consultants' proposals for funding the new agency are to 
be refined into an acceptable package. Because office space 
is instrumental in the phasing of the Development Strategy 
(a form of which would constitute the Providence Company's 
new Downtown Plan). property owners and property management 
companies should be better represented. Officials of all the 
major banks. of at least vice-president standing. should be 
invited to take part. especially as funding for individual 
development projects. as recommended in the Strategy. rely 
heavily on private financing. 
Also integral to coalition-building will be the presence 
of non-profit organizations concerned with housing and social 
issues. as well as the continued presence of a senior 
representative of the Capital Center Commission. The 
Department of Planning and Development ignored the tenants' 
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associations and socially-oriented agencies in its selection 
of Task Force members in June. 1986. If future downtown 
development is. as the consultants' suggest. dependent on the 
emergence of a "downtown neighborhood". the rights of current 
downtown dwellers must be fairly balanced against the 
anticipated influx of young. urban professionals and 
condominiumization. Representation of the academic community 
is well served by the expertise of current members. Glenn 
Kumekawa of The University of Rhode Island and Melvin Feldman 
of Brown University. Arthur Markos. Thomas Moses and 
Kathleen Field. the senior professional team within the 
Department of Planning and Development. should continue to 
hold seats. 
The re-aligned Task Force would consist of thirty 
members with two sub-committees. one addressing the elements 
of the Development Strategy which should be prioritized for 
implementation by the Providence Company. the other 
addressing the selection of members for the Providence 
Company Board. The nomination of members. three from the 
public sector and three from the private sector. would then 
be voted on by the City Council and the Chamber of Commerce. 
respectively. As described below. the professional staff of 
the Providence Company would be appointed by the Board and 
most definitely not by outside parties. By keeping the 
political debate and power-play in the arena of initial goal-
setting and agency formulation. once the Providence Company 
was established. it would be free to execute its Downtown 
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Plan independently of external forces. Only the 
constitutional checks of the Board's accountability to the 
City and the Chamber would be required. 
10.4 The Providence Company 
The need for a separate planning and management agency 
to deal solely with the interests of downtown Providence has 
never been greater. The model proposed by this section 
attempts to take account of a number of key factors in 
formulating a relevant. timely organization: 
1. Eighteen agencies and organizations dealing with 
downtown issues already exist. 
2. None of these agencies has a particularly good working 
arrangement with any other. 
3. There is much duplication of effort in some areas. 
while others are ignored entirely. 
4. The public and private power bases are interminably 
fragmented. with no partnership entity dealing with 
downtown currently in existence. 
5. The professional staff of the Department of Planning and 
Development are few in number and greatly overburdened 
with mandated day-to-day planning procedures. 
6. There has been no spontaneous 'internal' effort to 
institutionalize partnership in Providence. 
7. Other American cities have reaped enormous benefits 
by promoting sustained public-private partnership. 
The model is presented. in summary form. in Figure 10.1. 
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FIGURE 10.1 
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A detailed description is provided below. 
Representation 
There are two essential ingredients in the workability 
of the model: 
1 . The Providence Company would have two branches: a Board 
to set policy and receive input from other lobbyists/ 
organizations, and a line agency in the form of a non-
profit designed to be free from direct external forces. 
2. The Board would have three representatives each from the 
public and private sectors, thus institutionalizing the 
concept of partnership. The appointment of a 
chairperson would be by vote of the City Council and 
Chamber Executive Committee. 
The public appointees to the Board would be ratified by the 
City Council (and would therefore not technically by mayoral 
appointees), while the private members would be ratified by 
the Executive Board of the Chamber of Commerce (and therefore 
not be puppets of key downtown commercial interests). 
The non-profit agency would have three full-time 
professional staff, one drawn from the Department of Planning 
and Development (to ensure compatibility, complementarity and 
continuity in planning), the others to be selected from a 
nationally advertised search for planning and management 
experts. One of the two individuals hired from outside the 
City would have extensive fiscal and management experience. 
The professional staff would be appointed by the six Board 
members, free from the influences of both the Administration 
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and the private sector. This check is designed to protect 
the entity from abuses from its very beginnings. Two 
clerical staff members would be hired independently of 
of the public employee unions to allow for flexibility in 
promotions. firings and pay scales. The City would be 
required to provide secretarial and material support as 
necessary. 
While the Department of Planning and Development would 
serve as a permanent technical resource (its plans and data 
sources freely available to the Providence Company 
professional staff). an external Downtown Policy Advisory 
Panel (OPAP) would be established to transfer input from 
existing agencies into the overall goals of the new entity. 
The six member Panel would consist of the executive directors 
or senior administrators of the six agencies which have 
played the most significant role in the development. 
planning. management and preservation of downtown Providence. 
The Providence Company Board would be req u ired to meet with 
the Panel on a quarterly basis. but woul d n ot be bound by its 
recommendations. The Board alone would decide what policy 
best served the interests of downtown partnership. Board 
members would serve for four years and then be required to 
stand for re-election. The planning/management professionals 
would have permanent positions. but could be dismissed by a 
majority vote of the Board. The Advisory Panel would change 
only if members were dismissed from the executive/ 
administrative directorships of their own agencies. 
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Planning. management and funding 
The purpose of the Providence Company would be to 
implement those elements of the Carr-Lynch-Levine Development 
Strategy selected and refined by the Task Force and. later. 
by the Board. to formulate the Downtown Plan. The Downtown 
Plan would be adopted by the Board and. within the confines 
of a designated 'Downtown Development District'. would be the 
substance of downtown planning for the next twenty years. 
The Providence Company Board would be encouraged to adopt the 
Downtown Plan within three months of its appointment. a 
period during which the line agency professionals would be 
interviewed and hired in preparation for plan execution. 
The content of the Downtown Plan would be assembled in a 
similar manner to the current Development Strategy. but would 
exclude generalizations and concentrate on designated 
development projects and infrastructure improvements. The 
Plan would be phased in three distinct sections. as proposed 
by Carr-Lynch-Levine. 
This vehicle. serving as the formal. institutionalized 
expression of partnership. would be free to enter into 
development agreements with both City agencies and private 
companies. Its funding and means of loaning monies would 
follow the Tax Incremental Financing proposals of the 
consultants. Whereas at present there is considerable 
opposition to T.I.F •• there is no superior means of 
generating capital for improvements. In terms of ceding 
power. this would be the private sector's major contribution 
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to the concept of partnership and the validity of broad based 
intervention in the free market. 
In the long-term, the benefits to be derived by commerce 
from increased activity in the city core would far outweigh 
the sacrifices of incremental tax levies. 
10.5 Summary 
It is hoped that this thesis has made a sound case for a 
new management entity in downtown Providence. Section I 
outlined the economic necessity for greater attention by 
policy makers - both public and private - on the core area of 
Rhode Island's capital city. The initial chapters also 
analyzed the work of the consultants and identified severe 
shortcomings in their Development Strategy. 
In attempting to overcome the inertia generated by the 
mayoral elections and the poor handling of the Strategy (from 
its inception through the post-presentation review phase), a 
rational attempt was made in Section II to present a detailed 
outline of what the City might try next. If Mayor Paolino's 
Department of Planning and Development can use its Task Force 
as a non-partisan tool to build a coalition around the 
Providence Company and bring a lasting focus to bear upon 
downtown, it will achieve what no Administration has ever 
achieved in Providence: a meaningful and effective 
partnership between the public and private sectors. 
*** 
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